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9Executive summary
While technical experts and donors profess an 
ambition to adapt conventional disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) approaches to conflict contexts, 
they struggle to overcome the long-held perception 
that this is not a viable option. Conflict can 
undermine national disaster risk governance 
and the implementation of DRR strategies, and 
conflict contexts are often considered too difficult 
an environment in which to deliver DRR. In such 
conditions, disaster risk management is likely 
to be a low government priority, with action 
limited to protection and response. Afghanistan 
presents a contrasting picture, where a national 
strategy has been formulated and includes explicit 
consideration of the conflict environment, and 
where some local DRR interventions are linking 
with conflict prevention ambitions. 
Afghanistan has been beset by numerous 
disasters in recent years, with a high toll of death 
and displacement. Thousands have been injured, 
killed or forced to flee their homes as a result of the 
country’s longstanding conflict. DRR has become 
a major concern for international donors and the 
Afghan government over the past decade. This 
study explores how DRR initiatives and projects are 
being linked with conflict prevention, ‘do no harm’ 
principles and peacebuilding efforts to show that 
it is possible to mitigate against natural hazards 
while also seeking to reduce the risk of conflict. The 
study also strikes a note of caution that, while DRR 
is possible, it requires long-term, dedicated effort 
and continuous monitoring. Of particular concern 
is the scope of current DRR projects, as the tailored 
approaches required in remote disaster-prone 
communities do not easily allow for scaling up.
Learning from Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one of the most disaster-prone 
countries in the world, with nearly all of its 
34 provinces affected by at least one natural 
disaster over the past 30 years. In 2018, the 
lives and livelihoods of more than 4 million 
Afghan people were threatened by floods, storms, 
droughts and landslides. This figure is almost 
three times higher than the number of people 
requiring humanitarian assistance on account of 
conflict. Meanwhile, after more than 30 years 
of armed struggle, the country has a low level of 
socioeconomic development, reduced governance 
and only basic capacity for disaster recovery and 
resilience-building. While some national policy 
documents articulate the importance of linking 
disasters with conflict, there is limited capacity 
to design and deliver relevant implementation 
strategies. Corruption, mistrust of the 
government and lack of transparent governance 
add a further layer of complication.
Afghanistan exemplifies many of the themes 
emerging from recent studies of DRR in contexts 
of conflict. Protracted conflict and state fragility 
have undermined disaster risk management 
and increased people’s vulnerability to natural 
hazards. Furthermore, international attention has 
tended to focus on relatively accessible locations, 
largely neglecting what happens in areas where 
the state does not control territory. Another issue 
of concern is that different types of violence tend 
to be treated in the same way, which means that 
new opportunities or entry points for building 
disaster resilience may be overlooked.
The research highlights the need for approaches 
to DRR that consider the multiple and varied 
conflict dynamics in which they operate. State 
institutions and the international community tend 
to focus on the national level, whereas local-level 
manifestations of conflict can be much more 
important in terms of programme implementation. 
Failing to take account of local societal issues can 
mask the multiple causes of vulnerability, resulting 
in projects that may not adequately address the 
root causes of disasters. If not adapted to the local 
context, DRR interventions have the potential to 
cause or exacerbate social conflict. 
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Towards a more holistic approach
In addition to revealing the complexity of 
working with conflict dynamics in Afghanistan, 
the study also illustrates a new trend in 
approaches to DRR. While previously hazard-
focused infrastructure projects and responses 
to rapid-onset disasters were the norm, there is 
now a move towards explicit consideration of 
local resilience, with interventions taking a more 
holistic approach to intersecting threats and 
risks. A number of aid agencies have adapted 
their approach to DRR through a process of 
conflict analysis, centring on a commitment to 
‘do no harm’. Although not specifically oriented 
towards conflict resolution or peacebuilding, 
these approaches nonetheless can help reduce 
the risk of conflict. This change of tack has come 
in response to lessons from the past and current 
donor trends linking DRR with topics such as 
climate change, development and education.
The research also revealed a lack of 
consideration of intersectionality, or the 
ways in which power systems affect the most 
marginalised in a society. Uniform approaches 
to ‘community’ are coming under increasing 
scrutiny, with calls for more attention to 
different forms of vulnerability and how to  
make DRR policies more inclusive. An 
intersectional approach offers a more nuanced 
perspective than is typical in DRR programmes 
by taking contextual realities into account, 
and recognising that people experiencing 
marginalisation have different identities, needs 
and priorities. The study also calls for attention 
to the relationship between disasters and gender, 
climate change and urbanisation.
Afghanistan has taken significant steps to 
advance its ability to access and utilise climate 
finance. Although not always explicit, many 
interventions are enhancing DRR, including  
the adoption of early warning systems, but  
there is still a need to build institutional  
capacity to bolster those links; to work with 
international funding mechanisms to enable 
climate funds to be channelled to high-intensity 
conflict contexts; and to link programmes 
including adaptation and conflict and DRR 
components more closely with national policies 
on sustainable development.
Recommendations 
DRR in Afghanistan is taking more account of 
the relationships between hazards, vulnerabilities 
and capacities. DRR is now being pursued both to 
‘do no harm’ and to minimise conflict risk. These 
insights lead to several key recommendations.
Build capacity and strengthen coordination
This includes strengthening local knowledge 
on the basic concepts of DRR, and deepening 
understanding of how disaster risks manifest 
and the interrelationships with conflict. It 
also involves developing remote monitoring 
technologies to overcome access issues. 
Encouraging donors to make conflict-sensitive 
processes compulsory in project design and 
delivery will facilitate the allocation of resources 
to training and building knowledge on conflict 
analysis. Inter-agency coordination and learning 
also needs to be improved.
Scale up action on DRR in a conflict-sensitive 
manner
Understanding of and action on climate and 
disaster risk should be guided by explicit 
emphasis on the links between natural hazards, 
conflict and peace. There is a need to develop 
conceptual and operational approaches that 
improve the integration of DRR with actions 
relating to minimising conflict, and to move 
beyond short-term timeframes. Conflict analysis 
at various scales can be used to inform the design 
and delivery of national and local DRR strategies 
and plans. Stronger collaborations between 
disaster, climate and peace actors could bolster 
knowledge and mature programme design.
Integrate learning from DRR and conflict 
into intersectional and climate change 
adaptation ambitions
Lessons from the DRR community should be 
better documented and shared to strengthen the 
evidence base and promote systematic inclusion 
of DRR and conflict in adaptation programmes. 
This could attract additional funding for DRR 
through climate finance and other sectors, helping 
governments to improve coherence between 
parallel strategies, each striving to support 
peaceful and sustainable development progress.
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1 Introduction 
1 High-intensity conflicts represent specific moments in a protracted crisis, where violence occurs on a large scale. Relevant 
characteristics include that the national and local governments and authorities have no effective, or scattered or reduced, 
control over (part of) the national territory, and there are high levels of state fragility. The provision of goods and essential 
services is irregular, reduced or non-existent in some areas, and casualties usually exceed 1,000 per year. See Mena (2018a).
Afghanistan bears witness to many of the 
themes emerging from the growing evidence 
base on the intersection of DRR and conflict 
(see Peters et al., 2019a). It shows how disaster 
impacts are already having a severe effect on 
conditions of vulnerability; how protracted 
and high-intensity conflict1 undermines 
basic disaster risk governance, which in turn 
increases natural hazard vulnerabilities; and 
how international attention to conflict leads 
to broad-brush characterisations of a context 
where one dimension of risk – active armed 
conflict – overrides others, to the detriment of 
an understanding of what DRR actions might be 
viable in a high-intensity conflict.
Evidence presented in this report also reveals 
how, on closer inspection, ideas slowly emerging 
in disasters discourse, such as whether DRR can 
be a vehicle for conflict prevention (see Peters 
et al., 2019d), are being put into practice. This 
is explored through a number of projects which 
seek to link DRR with conflict sensitivity and 
peacebuilding approaches. We posit that what 
is happening in practice may be more advanced 
than the dominant disaster discourse suggests, 
and as such offers new lessons from which any 
active pursuit of DRR in conflict contexts might 
benefit. The findings also raise questions about 
how, when DRR is not anchored in existing 
institutional structures in high-intensity conflict, 
a lack of institutionalisation undermines the 
feasibility, results and sustainability of any changes 
stimulated through DRR projects. As yet, there 
is insufficient knowledge and understanding to 
devise alternative ‘solutions’ to secure disaster 
resilience for people vulnerable to disasters and 
conflict. Using the case of Afghanistan, this paper 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
way in which DRR projects can be implemented 
in high-intensity conflict scenarios with a conflict-
sensitive approach. In other words, it explores the 
ways in which DRR initiatives and projects link 
with conflict prevention, do no harm principles or 
peacebuilding efforts. It looks at:
 • The policies and institutional landscape  
of DRR.
 • The practice of DRR, and how DRR projects 
operate in, on and around conflict. 
 • The main operational challenges facing DRR 
in high-intensity conflict.
The remainder of this section presents 
foundational ideas that ground the work, 
including the role of conflict in the construction 
of disaster risk and how this manifests itself in 
Afghanistan. Section 2 describes the multi-hazard 
context in Afghanistan and the methodology 
employed in the study. Section 3 explores the 
DRR ‘landscape’ in Afghanistan: the institutional 
architecture, policies and financing and the main 
actors. Section 4 analyses how DRR works 
around, in and on conflict at different levels 
through three DRR interventions. Section 5 
reviews cross-cutting operational challenges 
pertinent to DRR in conflict contexts, including 
issues that have not been mainstreamed or have 
been neglected. Finally, Section 7 provides a set 
of recommendations for advancing DRR in high-
intensity conflict.
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1.1 Disasters and DRR in 
Afghanistan 
In 2018, the number of people affected by 
disasters in Afghanistan (slow- and sudden-onset) 
reached more than 4 million – almost three times 
higher than the number of people requiring 
humanitarian assistance on account of conflict 
(OCHA, 2018a: 4). Afghanistan is classified as 
‘fragile’ within Asia, and is one of four ‘fragile’ 
countries which collectively accounted for 55% of 
all climate-related disaster deaths in Asia between 
1997 and 2016. Despite some minor fluctuations, 
Afghanistan has consistently ranked high on 
international indices of ‘fragile states’, appearing 
in every OECD Fragile states report since 2008 
(OECD, 2018: 26). In the 2018 edition, four of 
the ‘top fragile cities’ were in Afghanistan, a result 
of a complex mix of ‘conflict-related violence and 
terrorism, above-average unemployment and low 
access to basic services’ (OECD, 2018: 33). 
Afghanistan suffers from a range of hazards, 
including floods, storms, droughts and landslides 
(see Section 2). These are increasingly gaining 
attention, nationally and internationally. In 
addition to government action on disaster 
policy, significant high-value infrastructural 
investments in disaster mitigation have been 
delivered, as have local-scale emergency 
preparedness and capacity-building initiatives. 
Heijmans (2012) and Mena (2018b) provide 
rare examples of robust empirical research 
explicitly on vulnerabilities and disaster impacts 
as they relate to conflict in Afghanistan. Their 
research focuses on the political risks of DRR in 
a country affected by conflict. Mena (2018b: 10) 
presents cases where the building of mitigation 
infrastructure generated divisions within 
communities over who would work for the 
project and receive a salary. 
More often, dominant international discourses 
on Afghanistan ‘lump all types of violence 
together’ (Kurtz et al., 2018: 1), adopting 
a reductionist approach to the complexity, 
turbulence and scale-specific considerations of 
violence and conflict. One consequence is that 
opportunities for progressing DRR and supporting 
disaster resilience are often overlooked, be this 
through existing channels, new entry points or 
adapted programming approaches. The evidence 
and examples revealed through this research 
run counter to the norm and, as such, offer 
new insights for managing disaster risk in high-
intensity conflict contexts, for example considering 
the micro-dynamics of conflict or conflict at the 
local and community level.
Conflict is both the context in which DRR 
operates and a driver of disaster vulnerability; 
but there is also a converse relationship. Disaster 
impacts can exacerbate conflict dynamics. 
Prolonged drought in Afghanistan between 
2006–2007, for instance, has reportedly 
increased the vulnerability of young men to 
recruitment by militias that can pay them for 
their services (UNESCAP, 2018). The reciprocal 
relationship between interventions and their 
conflict context has long been considered in 
fields beyond DRR (see Barnett and Weiss, 
2008; Hilhorst, 2013a; Kurtz et al., 2018), but 
within DRR practice this has remained relatively 
anecdotal or confined to organisational project 
management reports. Here we shed light on 
examples of operational approaches to DRR 
that consider the conflict dynamics in which they 
operate, be this working ‘around’ or ‘in’ conflict 
(see Section 4). Individual project examples 
operate under a broader national DRR policy 
architecture (see Section 3).
The links between disasters and conflict 
are made clear in many Afghan DRR policy 
documents, which articulate how conflict 
contributes to disaster vulnerability, destroys 
flood protection measures and undermines the 
country’s ability to anticipate, prepare for and 
respond to shocks (Government of Afghanistan, 
2003b; 2011; 2014): ‘The distinction between 
man-made and natural disasters is no longer 
that clear when we consider the complex causes 
of droughts, landslides and floods’ (ANDMA, 
2011: 17). The changing nature of conflict is also 
recognised (ibid.). 
Moreover, in high-profile regional ministerial 
gatherings on DRR, Afghanistan has been one 
of the few proponents of explicitly articulating 
the challenges that conflict presents to delivering 
effective disaster risk governance (Government 
of Afghanistan, 2018b; ANDMA, 2018b), and in 
turn its contribution to the global goals set out in 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015). Yet to date, practical 
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or policy advice on how to advance DRR in 
Afghanistan and other contexts of protracted and 
high-intensity conflict remains scant. 
1.2 The role of conflict in the 
construction of disaster risk
Several recent studies have explored the 
relationship between and co-occurrence of 
conflicts and disasters (Maxwell and Majid, 2015; 
Peters and Budimir, 2016; Mena, 2018a; Siddiqi, 
2018, Hilhorst et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2019a). 
Spiegel et al. (2007) evaluated more than a 
decade’s worth of data, finding that several natural 
hazard-related disasters overlap with different 
types of conflict (including complex emergencies 
and epidemics). Other reports outline how 
disasters can intensify conflicts and, conversely, 
how conflicts affect the outcomes of disasters or 
responses to them (Bui, 2008; Hilhorst, 2013b; 
Omelicheva, 2011; Peters and Budimir, 2016; 
Wisner et al., 2003; Peters et al., 2019a).
2 Calculated using total spending (gross disbursements) on emergency response (Tag 720) and total spending (gross 
disbursements) on disaster prevention and preparedness (Tag 740) from the OECD (2018) ‘Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS)’ (electronic dataset, OECD. Stat, OECD) (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1#), for the period 
1997–2016; top 10 Asian countries on the 2018 Fragile States Index, by grouping (alert/warning); the Fund for Peace 
(2018) ‘Fragile States Index 2018’ (electronic dataset, Fund for Peace) (http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/excel/).
A large number of disasters occur in fragile 
or conflict-affected areas (ECHO, 2013). Over 
the decade 2004 –14, 58% of disaster deaths 
occurred in the 30 countries topping the list 
of state fragility (Peters and Budimir, 2016). 
For the period 2005–10 Afghanistan ranked 
sixth on the Fragile States Index and seventh 
in terms of disaster occurrence, and was in 
the top 30 countries for disaster deaths and 
number of people affected (ranking 16th and 
29th respectively). Afghanistan was also costly 
for the international community, as the sixth-
highest recipient of humanitarian aid. This 
was not, however, reflected in volumes of DRR 
assistance, which did not appear in the top 30 
(Peters and Budimir, 2016: 6–7). For every $100 
spent on response, just $2.24 was spent on DRR 
(Peters, 2018: 24).2 This mismatch is in part 
what prompted increased attention to the real 
and perceived barriers to channelling financial 
resources to DRR in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts (see Peters, 2017).
Figure 1 The role of violence, conflict and fragility in the construction of disaster risk
Note: definitions of key terms including ‘disaster risk’, ‘hazard’, ‘exposure’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘coping capacity’ are sourced 
from the UNISDR terminology guidance (www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology) accompanying the Sendai Framework 
(UNISDR, 2015). 
Source: Peters (2018: 9).
Disaster risk
The potential loss of life, 
injury, or destroyed or 
damaged assets which 
could occur to a system, 
society or a community in 
determined probabilistically 
as a function of hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and 
capacity.
Hazard 
A process, phenomenon 
or human activity that may 
cause loss of life, injury 
or other health impacts, 
property damage, social 
and economic disruption 
or environmental 
degradation.
Exposure 
The situation of people, 
infrastructure, housing, 
production capacities 
and other tangible human 
assets located in hazard-
prone areas.
Vulnerability 
The conditions 
determined by physical, 
social, economic and 
environmental factors or 
processes which increase 
the susceptibility of an 
individual, a community, 
assets or systems to the 
impacts of hazards.
Counteracted by coping 
capacity which is the ability 
of people, organizations and 
systems, using available  
skills and resources, to 
manage adverse conditions, 
risk or disasters.
Violence,  and 
fragility can form part 
of the wider conditions 
of vulnerability in which 
people live. Conditions 
fragility are part of the 
disaster risk equation, 
affecting how, where and 
when disasters happen – 
and need to be factored 
into how disaster impacts 
can be reduced.
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To understand the susceptibility of conflict-
affected contexts to natural hazards, we need 
to understand the nature of disasters (Hilhorst, 
2013b; Kelman, 2010; Wisner, 2012). Disasters are 
chiefly the result of social conditions rather than 
the presence of a natural phenomenon (UNISDR, 
2017b; USAID, 2011; Wisner et al., 2012; Bankoff 
et al., 2004). It is for this reason that academics 
and international agencies have agreed that the 
term ‘natural disaster’ should not be used. Disaster 
risks are mediated by the level of vulnerability 
of the population exposed to their effects. Issues 
of violence, conflict and fragility are thus part of 
the construction of disaster risk (see Figure 1). In 
conflict-affected contexts, vulnerability is usually 
increased, whereas risk reduction and response 
capacities are eroded (Hilhorst, 2013b; Twigg, 
2015; Wisner, 2012; Peters, 2017) – making these 
areas and populations especially prone to high-
impact disasters.
1.3 DRR in conflict situations
The need for disaster management in places 
affected by conflict has increasingly been 
emphasised over the past decade (Peters, 2017). 
The difficulties and costs of responding to 
disasters (rather than taking steps to prevent 
them), particularly in areas affected by high-
intensity conflict, have led to increased interest 
in DRR strategies in these settings (Mena, 
2018a; Peters, 2017; Peters and Peters, 2018). 
There are many potential benefits stemming 
from the implementation of DRR: a reduction 
in mortality rates in hazard-prone areas, in the 
cost of post-disaster health treatment and in 
hunger and malnutrition, enhanced coordination 
and cooperation between multiple stakeholders, 
reduced deforestation and greenhouse gas 
emissions and improved or restored water and 
soil conservation efforts. DRR can address climate 
change causes and effects, and can facilitate 
climate change adaptation (FAO, 2017; Kenny, 
2012; Twigg, 2015; UNISDR, 2015). At the same 
time, there has long been an anecdotal concern 
that implementing DRR projects in conflict areas 
is highly complicated – if not impossible.
DRR is not common in high-intensity conflict, 
complex emergencies or (civil) war situations 
(Peters, 2017; Twigg, 2015). The main reasons for 
this are the challenge of long-term planning and 
funding due to political fragility and instability, 
a lack of basic services, insecure and unsafe 
environments, complex logistics, high levels of 
displacement, corruption and high operational 
costs (Twigg, 2015; Mena, 2018a). A study of 
nine countries affected by disaster and conflict 
concluded that ‘violent conflict (or the risk of it) or 
related political tensions can hinder disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and recovery activities across all 
levels, and can divert political attention away from 
the importance of disaster issues’ (UNDP, 2011: 8).
Areas affected by high-intensity conflict 
are often ‘seen as having a low capacity for 
implementing large-scale DRR’ (Feinstein 
International Center, 2013: 16). According to 
Wisner (2012: 71), violent conflict can hamper 
DRR in a range of ways. As a result, ‘very little 
exists, conceptually or programmatically, on 
how to effectively pursue DRR in FCAC [fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts]; approaches 
and concepts are not tailored to the specific 
conditions affecting FCAC, and there is no 
community of practice to document and share 
learning from these contexts’ (Peters, 2017: 10). 
Even less common is practical and operational 
knowledge of DRR in conflict-affected areas in 
relation to peacebuilding, conflict prevention, 
do no harm principles and conflict-sensitive 
approaches. As presented by Anderson, ‘when 
international assistance is given in the context 
of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that 
context and thus also of the conflict’ (1999: 1). 
Similar concerns apply when delivery is 
channelled through local implementing agencies. 
When it comes to disaster management and 
DRR, the situation is no different. Therefore, 
how can we deliver DRR outcomes in ways that 
do no harm, and possibly even have a positive 
impact on dynamics of peace and conflict?
1.4 The politics of disasters
Disasters, everywhere, are highly politicised 
events. They are political because differentiated 
vulnerabilities produce different impacts; their 
effects are uneven and, hence, affect the social 
realities in which they occur. Besides the well-
documented detrimental impacts of disaster 
events, there are examples where people with 
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the economic or political power to capitalise or 
benefit from disasters do so by deciding on or 
promoting action that will benefit them. In conflict 
situations, disaster-related decisions and actions 
can tilt the balance. A notorious example is the 
1984 Ethiopian famine, where the government of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam multiplied the effects of 
drought and refused to allow relief into rebel-held 
parts of the country (de Waal, 1991).
DRR, including disaster response, is also 
political in that it includes values and choices, 
priorities and the allocation of resources. DRR 
is inherently political: it involves deciding on 
the risks to be addressed, the allocation of 
burdens brought about by particular risks, the 
intentions and interactions of different actors 
and the application of certain techniques over 
others, with implications on the generation and 
allocation of knowledge and resources (Hilhorst, 
2013b). In cases of conflict, these decisions 
are more likely to be politicised because of 
heightened pre-existing tensions. The politics of 
the disaster response following the 2004 tsunami 
in Sri Lanka, where parts of the country felt 
discriminated against, is generally thought to 
have rekindled the conflict there (Waizenegger 
and Hyndman, 2010). DRR is also affected by 
the wider political economy. Competition over 
leadership, factions, conflict, criminality, markets 
and policies in other domains may all influence 
the creation of disaster risks and DRR. 
Others have extended this line of enquiry 
to stress the inherently political nature of the 
processes which result in disasters, to pursue 
a deeper understanding of the construction of 
vulnerabilities to hazards – particularly in conflict 
contexts (Siddiqi, 2018; Harris et al., 2013) – not 
just in the aftermath of a disaster, but also in daily 
life. Everyday politics are about the deliberate or 
implicit political dimensions of everyday living, 
involving people ‘embracing, complying with, 
adjusting or contesting norms and rules regarding 
authority over, production of, or allocation of 
resources and doing so in quiet, mundane and 
subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organised 
and direct’ (Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). To illustrate this, 
Box 1 provides excerpts of an analysis of everyday 
politics, water resource management and DRR. 
Box 1 Everyday politics, water resource management and DRR
Ethnographic research from Heijmans (2012) presents the case of the Afghan locality Khulm, in 
Samangan Province, during 2008.1 It shows how conflict related to water management between 
communities up- and downstream relates to a community-based DRR pilot project.
Conflict related to water access and use resulted from changes in water governance following 
the defeat of the Taliban in the area in 2001. Under the Taliban water was distributed in 
quantities relative to the size of land, providing a more objective solution that reduced tensions 
over the control of water (ibid.). After the fall of the Taliban, local governance, including water 
management, relied on a system in which decisions were made by military commanders in positions 
of power, who tended to favour people closely affiliated to them, mainly upstream communities. 
A new irrigation system sought to provide more equitable access to water. However, the 
result was a riverbed higher than surrounding villages and fields, leaving communities prone 
to flash floods, as occurred in 2006. To avoid floods, upstream communities try to clean the 
ice accumulated in canals during the winter to allow water to flow, but may lack the tools 
and means to do this in a timely way. Heijmans explains how lack of support from the local 
government is not a result of a lack of resources, but might be because officials have land 
downstream and, for them, floods are positive and necessary. Drought can be a more serious 
problem than floods in Khulm, and in periods of water scarcity upstream communities can close 
canal gates and divert water for their own needs before it reaches communities on the lower 
sections of the river. All of these different strategies result in or exacerbate conflict.
1 Khulm, formerly part of Samangan Province, is now part of Balkh.
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1.5 Categories of conflict
This report draws a distinction between macro, 
meso and micro conflict. This derives from 
interviewees’ descriptions – explicitly and 
implicitly – of three levels of conflict, which 
in different ways shape DRR and disaster 
management policies, strategies and programmes. 
Respondents used these descriptions to denote 
different types of conflict, with varying scales, 
actors and impacts. These three levels can be 
characterised as follows: 
 • National level (macro): represents the 
national conflict involving armed opposition 
groups, in this case predominantly the 
Taliban. This conflict directly and indirectly 
affects the entire territory of the country, and 
attracts most international attention.
 • Provincial level (meso): represents conflicts 
at the provincial level, involving warlords, 
opposition systems of governance, corruption 
and a lack of resources and functional 
institutions. Conflicts at this level are closely 
related to the macro-national conflict, while 
also having an impact on communities’ 
livelihoods, since it is in this intermediate 
space where the power to decide politics and 
actions at the local level resides.
 • Local and community level (micro): 
represents conflicts between local 
populations, and between local populations 
and external actors such as NGOs and 
government structures. Conflicts at this level 
can include disputes over the control and 
use of natural resources, rivalries based on 
religious or political differences, differences 
among community members related to 
decision-making processes or differences 
between communities over the use and 
control of territory.
This distinction, while useful shorthand, can 
imply a concrete separation between conflict 
dynamics and/or underplay the relationship 
between them. Despite this limitation, the 
promotion, implementation and management 
of DRR projects in Afghanistan are affected 
and shaped in different ways by each of these 
levels of conflict, and therefore they are useful 
analytical categories reflecting how local to 
international actors make sense of the complex 
and dynamic nature of conflict in the country.
Interviewees frequently used these categories 
(macro, meso, micro) to explain and explore how 
conflict could affect DRR projects implemented 
in contexts outside of those affected by armed 
groups. This led to a second categorisation, 
between working in, on and around conflict 
(Goodhand, 2001):
 • Working around conflict: recognises conflict 
as an impediment to development projects, 
and projects are therefore implemented in 
areas where there is no active violent conflict. 
In Afghanistan, DRR projects are mainly 
organised in government-controlled areas. 
 • Working in conflict: recognises the links 
between an intervention and the conflict, 
and that each can mutually affect the 
other. Projects are developed in such a way 
that they do not exacerbate, create or are 
negatively affected by conflict. For example, 
DRR projects are implemented in areas 
affected by meso and micro conflict, but that 
does not mean they have an ambition to 
contribute to resolving those conflicts directly.
 • Working on conflict: includes all those 
activities and strategies being implemented 
by the project to deliberately address the 
conflict and its causes, and seek to resolve or 
modify the dynamics around the conflict, for 
example cases where DRR projects explicitly 
decide to work on conflict, in its resolution 
or management.
The second category (working in conflict) 
has many similarities with the do no harm 
approach. In her book, Anderson (1999) calls 
on humanitarian and development actors to 
avoid doing harm by carefully analysing how 
aid can create or exacerbate conflict, and to 
design interventions in such a way that negative 
dynamics are avoided. With this distinction 
in mind, Harris et al. (2013: 28) state that 
projects addressing conflict and disaster 
risk simultaneously can be positioned on a 
continuum: ‘At one end of the continuum DRR is 
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seen as a vehicle for enacting conflict prevention 
objectives; at the other end, agencies work 
“around” conflict dynamics, but often adopt 
“Do No Harm” principles’.
Given the multi-layered nature of conflict in 
Afghanistan, the distinctions of working around, 
in and on conflict can also be analysed at these 
different levels.
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2 The case of Afghanistan
One of the main challenges in studying DRR 
in the midst of protracted and high-intensity 
conflict is the relatively scant attention paid to 
disasters in relation to conflicts (Mena, 2018a). 
At the same time, a violent or armed conflict 
is usually posited as being a higher priority for 
redress in comparison to natural hazard-related 
disaster risk, and its resolution is often seen as 
necessary before the latter can take precedence 
(Peters, 2017). The impact of disasters in conflict 
contexts, including Afghanistan, has reinforced 
arguments that DRR must take place in these 
contexts, though little is known about what 
kinds of actions are viable and appropriate. 
Despite the obvious challenges of achieving DRR 
outcomes in a context of high-intensity conflict, 
evidence collected for this report shows that, in 
the years after the 2011 peace agreement, when 
the conflict seemed to subside, spaces opened 
up for post-conflict recovery and DRR entered 
the agenda in Afghanistan. Over the last decade, 
multiple disaster risk management, development-
related and natural resource management 
projects have been implemented, many of which 
paid attention to the need to adequately manage 
current and future disaster risk (ARC, 2016; 
UNEP, 2013; 2016).
Today, DRR projects are being promoted 
widely and there is an emerging body of DRR 
policies. However, as stated by the government  
of Afghanistan:
The disaster policy in Afghanistan is 
also affected by the civil war in the 
country. [B]efore the war in the country 
we had some policy and management 
against the disaster mitigation 
management, unfortunately due to civil 
war we did not develop that policy … 
we [even] lost what we had in the past 
(ANDMA, 2018b: 8).
As a result, some DRR projects have explicitly 
included elements of conflict prevention, 
mitigation or resolution strategies (Clark-
Ginsberg, 2014; Mena, 2018b). Despite the 
small number of implemented projects, there is 
a sufficient body of knowledge and practice to 
enable the study of DRR implementation in areas 
with multiple social conflicts. 
2.1 The multi-hazard landscape of 
Afghanistan: conflicts and disasters 
Afghanistan is a clear example of a multi-
hazard landscape. As one of the most disaster-
prone countries in the world, ‘over the last 
three decades nearly all of the country’s 34 
provinces have been affected by at least one 
natural disaster’ (NEPA and UNEP, 2015: 34), 
including earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, 
droughts, storms and floods (ARC, 2016; NEPA 
and UNEP, 2015; World Bank and GFDRR, 
2017). On average, disasters affect more than 
200,000 people a year in Afghanistan (OCHA, 
2018a), and since 1980 have resulted in more 
than 20,000 casualties, making it the country 
with the second highest fatality rate related to 
disasters worldwide (World Bank and GFDRR, 
2017). In 2018, more than 4 million people 
were affected by disasters (slow- and sudden-
onset) – almost three times the number of people 
requiring humanitarian assistance in response to 
conflict (OCHA, 2018a: 4). Of note is the severe 
drought affecting the north of the country in 
2018, leading to the displacement of more than 
275,000 people (OCHA, 2018b). In economic 
terms, damage from earthquakes, floods and 
droughts was projected to exceed $400 million 
in 2017 (ibid., 2017), but given the challenges 
of collating disaster loss data in high-intensity 
conflict contexts, this figure is widely regarded 
as an underestimate (Peters and Budimir, 
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2016). This was echoed during a DRR Working 
Group meeting in Afghanistan in November 
2017, where NGO, INGO and government 
representatives highlighted the need for more 
reliable sources of information to inform the 
design and delivery of DRR projects. 
One of the main factors contributing to 
vulnerability to and the impacts of disasters 
across the country is the protracted social conflict 
and crisis. More than 30 years of conflict and 
war have resulted in low levels of socioeconomic 
development, the destruction of coping 
mechanisms, reduced disaster risk management 
efforts, ineffective governance and reduced 
capacities to recover and build resilience (Donini, 
2012; NEPA and UNEP, 2015; World Bank and 
GFDRR, 2017). The poverty rate is almost 40% 
and food insecurity is increasing as drought, 
floods and conflict undermine livelihoods 
(World Bank, 2018). Governance is fragile and 
corruption commonplace. The country is 168th 
out of 189 on the Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2018), and 171st out of 178 on the 
Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2018).
The geography and climate of the country is 
also relevant, with rugged mountains, an arid 
and semi-arid climate and high mountain ranges 
and fertile plateaus in the south-west, and cold, 
wet and snowy winters in the north, leading to 
landslides, avalanches and floods. Dry and hot 
summers produce drought conditions in large 
swathes of the country, and there are regular high-
intensity earthquakes (Fraser, 2002; World Bank 
and GFDRR, 2017). Meanwhile, climate change 
is expected to lead to more frequent or severe 
climatic events (UNEP, 2016; WFP et al., 2016). 
The macro-level (national) crisis in the country 
dates back to the Cold War and the Soviet 
invasion in 1979. The civil war that followed 
the Soviet withdrawal ten years later led to the 
emergence of the Taliban regime, which in turn 
was toppled following the US-led intervention 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Today, between 
40% and 70% of the country is under the 
control of armed, state-contesting parties, 
including the Taliban, ISIS and the Haqqani 
Group (Jackson, 2018; Qazi and Ritzen, 2017). 
The arrival of US and allied forces during the 
1990s and the post-9/11 US-led intervention 
brought with it an extensive international 
humanitarian response, involving most UN 
agencies, hundreds of international and Afghan 
NGOs and multiple development agencies and 
donors. Between 2004 and 2014 Afghanistan 
was one of the three largest recipients of 
humanitarian relief (Reuters, 2015; Thevathasan, 
2015). It has also been one of the most insecure 
destinations for humanitarian workers, ranking 
the third most dangerous place globally in the 
2018 Aid worker security report (Stoddard et 
al., 2018). Aid workers are at risk of murder, 
kidnapping, physical violence and harassment 
(ibid.). Hospitals, schools, refugee and returnee 
centres, mosques, embassies, government offices 
and markets are also targets of suicide attacks, 
rockets and gunfire (BBC, 2018a; 2018b), 
resulting in thousands of civilian casualties. 
The instrumentalisation and political use of 
humanitarian aid has been a common challenge 
throughout the country (Donini, 2012).
2.2 Methodology
Primary and secondary evidence collated and 
analysed for this report is largely qualitative. 
Secondary data collection included a review of 
DRR policies, frameworks, tools and regulations 
at the global, national and local levels. A wealth of 
technical and project documents was analysed (see 
Annex 2), covering DRR and disaster management, 
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as well as linked topics including peacebuilding, 
social conflict, climate change, migration, gender, 
securitisation, fragile states and governance, 
development, emergency and humanitarian aid, 
natural resource management and sustainability. 
Fieldwork conducted in October–December 
2017 and February–March 2018 (for ISS) and in 
December 2018 (for GIZ/ODI) enabled primary 
data collection. Semi-structured interviews 
were held with representatives of international 
organisations (INGOs), local/national Afghan 
organisations (ANGOs), government officials 
and officers, donors, UN agencies, beneficiaries 
of DRR projects and private sector actors and 
facilitators of DRR projects. Other methods 
included observation of coordination meetings 
on DRR between multiple stakeholders and 
direct observation of DRR projects. Annex 1 
outlines a subset of the participants, events and 
documents that informed this report.
For the definitions of key terms, the research 
uses the UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction terminology guide (UNISDR, 2017b), 
which guides the implementation of the Sendai 
Framework (UNISDR, 2015). Here, DRR is 
defined as ‘preventing new and reducing existing 
disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of 
which contribute to strengthening resilience 
and therefore to the achievement of sustainable 
development’ (UNISDR, 2017b).
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3 The landscape of DRR 
in Afghanistan
3 The Sendai Framework, adopted at the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan in 2015, 
is ‘a 15-year, voluntary, non-binding agreement which recognizes that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk 
but that responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders including local government, the private sector and other 
stakeholders … The Sendai Framework is the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–
2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’ (UNISDR, 2015: n/p).
4 Shuras are development councils at the village level. They play the role of local parliaments.
Delivering DRR projects is often considered 
too challenging or even impossible in fragile 
or conflict-affected contexts (Harris et al., 
2013; Mena, 2018a; Peters, 2017), but the 
case of Afghanistan, at least for the areas of 
the country under government control, shows 
the contrary. This section outlines the social 
and political landscape of DRR in the country, 
from institutions to policies and financial 
arrangements. It introduces the actors delivering 
DRR projects, and the main strategies and 
practices related to their implementation.
3.1 The institutional and regulatory 
landscape for DRR
The main national institutional architecture for 
disaster management in Afghanistan comprises 
the National Disaster Management Commission 
(NDMC) and the Afghanistan National 
Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA). 
Established in October 2015, the Office of the 
State Ministry for Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Affairs (SMDM) is responsible 
for providing leadership and policy direction on 
disaster management in the country. The SMDM 
Minister of State acts as ANDMA’s director 
and has a mandate to coordinate all aspects of 
disaster management, from disaster mitigation to 
preparedness and response.
The ANDMA, as the NDMC’s and SMDM’s 
principal executing body, was restructured in 
2015 (ANDMA, 2018a). Initially established 
in the 1970s as the Department of Disaster 
Preparedness (DDP), ANDMA includes a 
department for Mitigation, Prevention and  
DRR, responsible for the development of disaster 
law and outlining the role of other institutions 
in relation to DRR. ANDMA also acts as the 
focal point for the implementation of the Sendai 
Framework3 (UNISDR, 2015), and through  
these efforts DRR information is collected  
and systematised.
Alongside the ANDMA’s National Office, 
the authority has 34 provincial offices that 
coordinate with Provincial Disaster Management 
Committees (PDMCs) and District Disaster 
Management Committees (DDMCs). With the 
support of ANDMA, these committees serve as 
the subnational link to the NDMC and act as 
a space for disaster management coordination 
between multiple government and civil 
society organisations. At the community level, 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) work 
in coordination with shuras4 and other relevant 
community committees (mosques, schools, elders 
or figures such as the mullahs (religious leaders) 
and maliks (village representatives)), and where 
relevant at the subnational level act as the main 
links to implementing organisations and donors.
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In practice, these institutional arrangements 
have largely failed to deliver DRR outcomes 
on the ground, and DRR is often deemed too 
difficult to implement by the Afghan government. 
As ANDMA reports (2018b: 9):
in the country, [in] some provinces, we 
have the office for disaster mitigation 
with poor condition[;] the main 
problem is that the government has 
not enough budget for the disaster 
mitigation policy, for example 
we don’t have the remote control 
system in the country[;] I can say 
the transportation system is one of 
the important parameter[s] in … 
disaster mitigation, the transportation 
condition is the worst in Afghanistan 
[in] some provinces like Badakhshan 
and Nooristan provinces we have no 
road system[;] there the people of the 
village [have to walk] more than 20 
hours [before] they will reach [a] car[;] 
in these districts in the winter season 
for more than four months we cannot 
go there because of the heavy snow [in] 
these mountain areas.
A World Bank-funded assessment concluded that:
[i]nterventions that aimed at prevention 
were almost non-existent, despite 
the apparent need for it in several 
of the provinces visited … As noted 
earlier, the dominance of response 
in ANDMA’s activity profile was 
not only widely observed through 
government representatives and 
external stakeholders, but readily 
acknowledged by the agency’s own staff 
in the provinces  
(Altai Consulting, 2017: 26).
In the absence of significant action through formal 
government structures, DRR interventions are 
largely carried out by local and international 
NGOs, UN agencies and other bodies, such as 
GIZ. Exchange of information and coordination 
is aided by two working groups: a UN Working 
Group on DRR (UN-DRR), managed by the 
World Food Programme (WFP), which includes 
representatives of the ANDMA and NGOs (via 
the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief 
and Development (ACBAR)); and an NGO DRR 
Working Group, co-chaired by the ANDMA and 
Save the Children. Several interviewees expressed 
disappointment at what they perceived as a lack of 
leadership from ANDMA in mobilising action to 
deliver against the Sendai Framework. In interviews 
and observations for this research, the ANDMA’s 
main achievements appear to have been sharing 
information and the organisation of training 
sessions on concepts related to DRR and the Hyogo 
and Sendai Frameworks (UNISDR, 2015). 
3.2 DRR frameworks and plans 
The main legal documents concerning disaster 
management are the Disaster Management 
Framework (2003), the Afghanistan Disaster 
Management Plan (2003) and the National Disaster 
Management Plan (2010). In 2011, the Afghanistan 
Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (SNAP) was developed (ANDMA, 
2011). The SNAP allocated DRR-related roles and 
responsibilities to several ministries, including the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
(MRRD), the Ministry of Energy and Water, the 
National Environmental Protection Authority, the 
Ministry of Urban Development, the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Public Health and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. The plan 
also envisaged a ‘roadmap’ up to 2020 linking 
national ambitions to the Hyogo Framework 
for Action, taking 2010 as a baseline year for 
tracking progress. A lack of resources and human 
and institutional capacity for DRR limited 
implementation of the SNAP and other DRR 
strategies in Afghanistan (Altai Consulting, 2017; 
ANDMA, 2018a; interview ANDMA), including 
the Disaster Management Strategy (2014–17) 
developed by the MRRD (2014) and building 
guidelines for earthquake-resistant construction 
and retrofitting (ANDMA, 2018b).
Subsequent to the SNAP, and as part of 
Afghanistan’s endorsement of the Sendai 
Framework, the country developed the Strategic 
Framework 2018–2028 (ANDMA, 2018c) 
and the Afghanistan Disaster Risk Reduction 
National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
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(SMDM and ANDMA, 2018). These have since 
become the main policy documents guiding 
DRR efforts. The aim of the Afghanistan 
National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(ASDRR) is to ‘guide multi-hazard reduction 
and management of disaster risk in development 
processes at all levels as well as within and across 
all sectors in Afghanistan, in line with the Sendai 
Framework’ (ibid.: 20). At the provincial level, 
DRR plans include the Badakhshan Provincial 
Disaster Management Plan and the Badakhshan 
Gender Standard for Disaster Risk Management 
(ANDMA, 2013).
While well intentioned, the country has limited 
capacity to design and deliver implementation 
strategies in line with the legislative and policy 
frameworks for DRR (Altai Consulting, 2017). 
The challenges were noted by government 
representatives throughout interviews for this 
study, and are recognised in the policy documents 
themselves – such as the Natural Disaster 
Mitigation Policy of Afghanistan (ANDMA, 
2018b). Although there is noteworthy ambition 
to address the complex linked vulnerabilities 
associated with disaster and conflict risk in 
integrated ways, the lack of clarity on how 
this can be achieved and the accountability for 
progress is scant (Peters et al., 2019c). 
3.3 The limits of state coordination 
of DRR
While the government formally leads on DRR, 
it is widely accepted that its role in financing 
and implementation is limited, instead choosing 
to prioritise peacebuilding (ANDMA, 2018b; 
2018c; interview, government official). In 
addition, there are other conflict-related reasons 
why state-led DRR is problematic in Afghanistan. 
Large areas of the country are outside of 
government control – and even in those regions 
controlled by the central authorities, interviewees 
from national and international NGOs conveyed 
that they avoided being seen as aligned with 
the government as this might compromise 
their neutrality. The lines between territories 
controlled by armed opposition groups and those 
administered by the central government change 
constantly (Jackson, 2018).
This challenging operating environment 
contrasts with the state-centric approach to DRR 
portrayed in the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 
2015), which envisages multiple stakeholders 
working under the coordination of formal 
government disaster risk governance structures. 
While all those interviewed recognised the 
central role and legitimacy of the Afghan 
government, several participants felt that the 
lack of implementation or enforcement of 
plans and policies leaves them operating in a 
regulatory vacuum.
The challenge of service delivery in non-
state-controlled areas is not unique to DRR, 
but it is one that the disaster, development and 
humanitarian communities at large are yet to 
adequately grapple with: ‘That the Taliban set the 
rules in vast swathes of the country is a reality 
with which few in the international community 
are willing to engage’ (Jackson, 2018: 5).
3.4 The financing landscape for DRR
There is no fixed national budget allocation for 
DRR. In interviews, ANDMA representatives 
mentioned that the authority has a budget of 
1.5 billion Afghanis (approximately $19.8 
million) for emergency response and DRR, 
but no fixed amount is assigned for DRR. The 
ANDMA indicated that ‘[t]he imbalance of 
ANDMA’s ability in fulfilling its functions is 
rooted in the budget, where relief is prioritized 
over Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)’ (Altai 
Consulting, 2017: 35). In its progress report for 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework, 
ANDMA (2015) estimated that 20% of the 
budget allocated for disaster management went 
to risk reduction or prevention. Although it 
was not possible to obtain exact figures, it can 
be estimated that about $4 million might be 
designated for DRR activities as part of the 
national budget. According to government 
officials, most of this was spent on maintaining 
basic institutional functioning at the national and 
provincial level, with little or no money reserved 
for activities in communities affected or at risk. 
ANDMA has no operational or decentralised 
funds for DRR, and there is thus no government 
funding for DRR at the subnational level.
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One reason for the modest DRR budget, 
according to Afghanistan’s Hyogo Framework 
progress report, was that ‘most of the national 
and sub national budget was allocated in the area 
of peace and reintegration, therefore, there was 
limited budget allocated for risk reduction, relief 
and reconstruction and recovery’ (ANDMA, 
2015: 7). This points to the challenge that 
conflict-related interventions restrict the available 
space for DRR, and with limited resources 
priority is given to securing peace and stability. 
In summary, financing for DRR is squeezed 
between reactive disaster response on the one 
hand, and peace and reintegration on the other. 
No systematic funding mechanisms exist to 
operationalise DRR policies in the country, and 
tracking the financial and budgetary landscape 
presents several challenges. First, DRR projects are 
often embedded in, or form part of, other projects, 
so extracting precise figures would require in-depth 
knowledge and line-by-line analysis of project 
budgets. Second, funding bodies and donors do 
not always use the terminology of ‘DRR’ to label 
activities or investments. Third, identifying and 
obtaining the financial records of DRR initiatives 
not funded via emergency or humanitarian funding 
can be extremely challenging.
While a precise breakdown of the humanitarian 
funds allocated for DRR does not exist, basic 
analysis of available data points to two trends. 
First, natural hazard-related disaster funds are 
small when compared with other humanitarian 
and emergency activities. Second, disaster-
related funds are mostly earmarked for disaster 
response, making funds intended for ex-ante 
DRR interventions even more difficult to trace, 
and where this is possible funds appear to be 
negligible. For example, analysis of the 2018 
response shows that, of a budget of $565.3 million 
(paid and committed funds, individual flows), 
only 2.6% went to disaster-related activities5 (FTS, 
2018). These funds have typically been used for 
reactive strategies. For example, those that were 
5 Analysis of Individual Flows Database and the selection of all financial lines with the following terms in the ‘description’ 
column: disasters, DRR, Eco-DRR, recovery (disaster-related recovery), risk reduction (disaster-related risk reduction), 
early warning systems (disaster-related early warning systems), preparedness (disaster-related preparedness), prevention 
(disaster-related prevention), mitigation (disaster-related mitigation), training (disaster-related training), first aid (disaster-
related first aid), walls (disaster-related walls), drought, earthquake, flood, storm, avalanche, natural (disaster-related 
natural events), hazards (disaster-related hazards).
earmarked for the 2018 drought and related 
displacement were meant for response, including 
aspects of longer-term risk reduction, but it is not 
clear what proportion was actually used for risk 
reduction. It was only possible to trace a financial 
scheme comprising $6.9 million, representing 
just 1.2% of the total humanitarian funding 
earmarked for the country in 2018.
There are other sources of funding for DRR 
in the country beyond those originating as a 
proportion of response, for example funding 
through resilience-building projects or from 
development funds as part of larger projects (like 
climate change initiatives), making it difficult to 
see the whole DRR financial landscape in the 
absence of further investigation.
3.5 The main international actors
DRR initiatives are mainly being implemented  
or funded by actors such as the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID), Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA), GIZ and European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). 
In interviews with donor representatives, many 
agencies reported a willingness to fund DRR 
initiatives, but there remained a widespread concern 
that needs far outstripped the resources available.
Projects explicitly labelled as DRR tend 
to focus on mitigation infrastructure and 
preparedness, using schools and community 
organisations for implementation and focusing 
on earthquakes and floods. Evidence was also 
found of DRR ambitions being embedded or 
funded in the context of projects with other 
priority areas, such as climate change and 
community-level development – specifically, 
in education projects (DON2, 3). There is a 
reciprocal relationship, wherein DRR projects 
include aspects of the aforementioned topics. 
The links between climate variability, climate 
change and the occurrence of extreme weather 
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events were often cited as resulting in disasters 
(see NEPA and UNEP, 2015; UNEP, 2016), 
making it relatively easy to justify programmes 
with DRR ambitions under the banner of climate 
change. For example, three projects branded as 
Eco-DRR6 initiatives refer to DRR as part of 
climate change response or adaptation, with the 
donors funding those projects also viewing them 
as part of their climate change portfolio. 
It was noted in interviews that participants 
often associate DRR with reducing the risk of 
rapid-onset disasters, and that drought and other 
slow-onset disasters are not considered part of 
DRR programming. Only two NGOs mentioned 
that they were planning to include drought in 
their DRR projects, albeit embedded in broader 
project designs. When asked about the possibility 
of having a specialised and focused drought risk 
reduction programme, respondents mentioned 
the difficulties related to obtaining funds for this 
under the banner of DRR: ‘for emergencies [on 
the other hand] it is easy, because you see the 
6 Eco-DRR is defined as ‘the sustainable management, conservation and restoration of ecosystems to reduce disaster risk, 
with the aim to achieve sustainable and resilient development’ (Estrella and Saalismaa, 2013: 30).
amount of people being displaced and affected. 
Everyone wants to do something about that’.
Most donors welcomed the inclusion of conflict 
risk reduction activities in DRR projects being 
developed and implemented, but did not actively 
promote or require this. Donors also spoke of the 
challenges conflict presents to the sustainability 
of project outputs and outcomes. For this reason, 
many put greater emphasis on deliverables which 
can be achieved within a short timeframe, and 
prefer to focus on directly visible results, such 
as mitigation walls or training, even if they are 
financing multi-year programmes. This is often 
justified in terms of monitoring and evaluation 
processes, namely that it is easier to report on 
or demonstrate that two mitigation walls were 
built or that 150 people participated in a training 
programme. Concerns were raised that projects 
involving activities which would only deliver visible 
results after long periods of time were more likely 
to fail because their longer duration increased the 
risk that they would be disrupted by conflict. 
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Figure 3 The evolution of DRR in Afghanistan
2 3
1971
Department for Disaster Preparedness 
established as the national organisation 
directly working on disaster risk, 
under which the Afghanistan National 
Disaster Management Authority (ANMA) 
was established in the same year. 
1979
The country was invaded 
by 80,000 Soviet troops 
resulting in a decade of 
violence as the Soviet-
sponsored regime failed to 
defeat the Mujahideen who 
opposed the occupation
1997
An extended drought believed to have 
begun in 1969 reached a critical state 
between 1997–2002, resulting in 
massive internal displacement, severe 
water shortage and crop loss, and the 
spread of various water-related diseases.
1996
Taliban regime 
established. 
1988
Soviet Union agreed to withdraw 
troops and establish a neutral Afghan 
state. However, the agreement failed 
to settle differences between the 
government and the Mujahideen, 
resulting in another decade of civil war. 
2001
US-led invasion resulted in 
the fall of the centralised 
Taliban regime. Peace and 
reconstruction agreements 
led to a national 
constitution and elected 
national parliament. 
Selected key policy moments, events and legislation 
The evolution of disaster risk 
reduction in Afghanistan
2002
First contingent of 
foreign peacekeepers 
– the NATO-led 
International Security 
Assistance Force – 
deployed.
2003
National Disaster 
Management Plan 
(NDMP) established 
by ANDMA to try to 
streamline disaster 
management systems 
at national level. 
2005
Afghanistan signed 
the Hyogo agreement.
National Environment 
Protection Agency 
established.
2004
New constitution ratified 
in an attempt to establish 
democratic government.
2006
NATO assumed responsibility for security 
across Afghanistan. 
2007
The foreign ministries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka established the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Food Bank to 
address regional food scarcity. 
2008
Afghanistan identified as a drought-
risk hotspot with conditions certain to 
deteriorate over the next 20–30 years 
(Government of Afghanistan, 2011)
Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy for Security, Governance, 
Economic Growth and Poverty 
Reduction (2008–2013) launched. 
2010
National Disaster Management Plan 
(NDMP) established, with aims to 
implement by 2015 the National Disaster 
Risk Reduction Plan and the National 
Disaster Response and Recovery Plan. 
A memorandum of understanding signed 
between Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to establish an effective framework for 
disaster management cooperation.
2009
Afghanistan’s National 
Adaptation Programme 
of Action (NAPA) jointly 
developed with its 
National Capacity 
Needs Self-Assessment 
(NCSA), providing the 
main policy document 
on climate change. 
2011
The Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster 
Risk Reduction: Towards Peace and Stable 
Development (SNAP) produced, aiming to create a 
safer and more resilient Afghanistan by lowering 
the risk of future catastrophes and climate 
change impacts. 
Afghanistan committed to joint disaster 
preparedness and response efforts under a new 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural 
Disasters at the 17th annual SAARC summit. 
2012
The Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) and 
Afghanistan’s National Disaster Management 
Authority (ANDMA) signed a landmark memorandum 
of understanding to improve the government’s legal 
preparedness for international disaster response.
The current National Disaster Management Law enacted 
to regulate activities related to disaster response, 
preparedness and risk reduction (both natural and 
manmade). ADNA became responsible for the regulation 
and coordination of disaster response activities and 
enforcement of the Disaster Management law. 
National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) 
established.
2014
Disaster Management Strategy (2014–17) established to 
expand coordination and collaboration within Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) programmes.
The US and UK ended combat operations in Afghanistan 
and NATO formally ended its 13-year combat mission. 
Violence persisted across much of the country; 2014 was 
the bloodiest year since 2001.
2015
Afghanistan endorsed the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.
A 7.5 magnitude earthquake affected northeastern 
Afghanistan, claiming 177 lives. 
Flooding and avalanches affected more than 8,000 
families and killed nearly 300 people.
Taliban representatives and Afghan officials held 
informal peace talks in Qatar. The Taliban insisted they 
would not stop fighting until all foreign troops withdrew.
2017
OCHA released its 2018–2021 
Afghanistan Humanitarian Response 
Plan (HRP), seeking $430 million to 
ensure timely response and save 
lives in areas of highest need. 
After almost four decades of conflict 
and violence, the security situation in 
Afghanistan deteriorated; reclassified 
from post-conflict to active conflict.
2018
The Afghanistan National Peace and 
Development Framework (ANPDF 
2017–2021) established with the aim 
to achieve self-reliance and increase 
people’s welfare by constructing a 
broad-based economy and ending 
corruption, criminality and violence. 
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4 DRR interventions: 
in and around conflict 
This section looks at how DRR and conflict in 
Afghanistan affect one another, and explores 
three projects that explicitly aim to address 
conflict, mainly with a do no harm approach. 
We close by considering the inverse – whether 
conflict-related interventions take disaster risks 
into account.
4.1 The relationship between 
DRR and scales of conflict 
According to a study by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP, 2013: 4), 
micro- and meso-level conflict in Afghanistan, 
especially disputes over natural resources, affects 
people more than macro-level conflict: ‘Disputes 
over water and land were the two most commonly 
reported reasons for violent conflict, accounting 
for 55 per cent of all cases in a 2008 survey. 
Another element to consider is the high presence 
of natural hazards that the country presents’.
Understanding of the ways in which DRR 
projects interact with and affect social conflict 
is divided. On the one hand, respondents from 
NGOs, UN agencies and the government 
recognised that DRR projects could help prevent 
small-scale social conflict at the micro level. 
On the other, some – chiefly academics and 
interviewees from INGOs – were unsure of 
the long-term contribution of DRR projects in 
reducing macro- and meso-level social conflict.
4.1.1 National-level (macro) conflict and DRR
DRR projects predominantly work around the 
macro conflict – at least in the physical sense 
in terms of location – as they take place in 
government-held areas. This is not, however, a 
clear distinction, because the conflict ‘border’ 
is constantly moving, and government-held 
provincial capitals are often surrounded by rural 
areas controlled by armed opposition groups. 
The macro-level (national) conflict affects DRR 
in a number of fundamental ways. Disaster risk is 
often a secondary concern to addressing conflict 
risk, with attention and resources prioritised 
for conflict, peace and security. Government 
authorities, UN actors and INGO representatives 
working at national or regional level also 
pointed to the many bureaucratic and security 
impediments to delivering DRR interventions. 
4.1.2 Provincial-level (meso) conflict 
and DRR
Conflict manifesting at the meso level significantly 
affects the space and opportunities to pursue 
DRR, for example by constraining funding and 
limiting political attention and will. Bureaucratic 
impediments play a significant role at the 
provincial level; if the authorities at the provincial 
or city level do not approve or facilitate projects, 
implementation is largely unviable.
One major complication at the provincial level, 
mentioned by most interviewees, is that agencies 
often have to negotiate with different authority 
figures. Whether the figure of authority comes 
from the government, armed opposition groups, 
former or current warlords or commanders or even 
religious authorities, their blessing is required to 
establish offices, obtain authorisation to implement 
the project and secure access to project locations.
Although these are general problems felt in all 
domains of service provision, the challenges in 
the case of DRR may be aggravated because most 
authorities are unfamiliar with DRR activities 
and need more explaining and convincing. DRR 
is also considered a concern of lesser importance 
compared to, for example, education, where 
the scope of programmes warrants higher-level 
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political attention. It is at this meso level that 
problems of corruption and embezzlement were 
reported most frequently by actors from local 
and international organisations. 
Finally, it is also at the meso level where 
the largest number of private sector actors are 
involved in DRR projects, playing a key role in 
providing goods and services. These actors and 
their role during DRR implementation are also 
subject to the primary and secondary effects of 
conflict, including corruption, inflation, insecurity 
and issues around access.
Agencies delivering DRR projects frequently 
said that they tried to work as much as possible 
around conflict dynamics at the macro level, 
while working in micro and meso conflict 
in affected areas. Agencies would, to the 
extent possible, take into account micro and 
meso conflict dynamics, but without aiming 
to influence them. For example, the NGO 
Coordination of Afghan Relief (COAR) (see 
Box 3) recognised that it can be difficult to 
obtain permits or deal with corruption. Without 
tools to analyse and address these problems, 
project staff told the study that they usually 
overcome such challenges with patience, 
thoroughly explaining the programmes and the 
benefits for communities to the authorities and 
being transparent about the limited resources 
available. There was one notable exception of a 
project that included ‘addressing provincial-level 
tensions’ in its design – see Box 4.
4.1.3 Local and community-level (micro) 
conflict and DRR 
At the local level, most communities, recipients 
of aid and local aid workers (from Afghan and 
international NGOs) said that, while significant, 
the effects of macro-level (national) conflict were 
mostly indirect. Projects were all working in 
government-controlled areas and, unless the macro 
conflict become central and led to the cessation 
of the project, at this level the macro conflict, 
chiefly between Taliban factions and the central 
government, was a lesser concern. Once aid actors 
have access to communities and are considered 
legitimate in the eyes of the group controlling the 
area (either an armed opposition group or the 
government), the macro conflict moves into the 
background and ceases to be a major challenge.
That said, every actor interviewed for this 
study believed that DRR projects need to 
consider micro conflict at the community level. 
This echoes findings from a survey of DRR 
projects and conflict in Afghanistan that show 
that ‘staff members clearly perceive the existence 
of social conflict in places where projects are 
implemented’ (Mena, 2018b: 3). The survey and 
research found evidence of multiple instances 
where DRR projects had to be postponed or 
cancelled because of localised social conflict. 
This included conflict related to the project (the 
allocation of jobs or choice of implementation 
areas), while others related to problems 
within and between communities (resource 
management, power struggles or historical 
differences). Every interviewee believed that DRR 
projects and programmes are not just affected 
by conflict at the community level, but can also 
create or exacerbate it.
Operational staff delivering DRR projects 
all mentioned during interviews that, in the 
preparation and pre-implementation phases of 
any project, care needs to be taken to assess 
whether the project would give rise to tensions 
within the community or between different 
communities, for instance around competition 
for the benefits project deliverables would 
bring. These can be long-term benefits that arise 
from the construction, use and management of 
infrastructure, or short-term benefits arising from 
cash-for-work projects or the employment of 
community members during implementation.
DRR projects can alter the landscape and 
natural resource base of communities, which can 
exacerbate tensions. A common example given 
was the construction of mitigation walls for flash 
floods which, by changing a river’s flow, affect 
users living at different points along the river. DRR 
in these cases may increase inequalities between 
communities (Heijmans, 2012 – see Box 1).
From interviews, it appears that most DRR 
projects have no explicit policy on working in 
conflict, and on paper appear to work around 
it. In practice, however, micro-level conflicts 
between and within communities are a major 
factor in the delivery of DRR programmes during 
their implementation. While there is often a 
stated ambition that a DRR project addresses 
these micro-level conflicts as they manifest, and 
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aims to do no harm by avoiding, exacerbating 
or creating conflicts, this is not always done 
systematically. There are, however, a number of 
projects that explicitly aim to address conflict as 
part of DRR.
4.2 DRR projects that explicitly 
consider social conflict
It is not the norm for DRR projects to explicitly 
consider conflict, in terms of being sensitive to a 
conflict context, or to actively address or prevent 
conflict. Given the dynamic conditions of conflict 
in Afghanistan, DRR approaches have had to 
be adapted. The three examples outlined below 
(Box 2, Box 3 and Box 4) shed light on how 
DRR approaches can adopt elements of conflict-
sensitive approaches.
The first case (Box 2) draws on a pre-existing 
example of a consortium which worked together 
to develop a tool to analyse conflict, which was 
subsequently integrated into project design and 
implementation (see Mena and ARC, 2018). The 
consortium comprised four INGOs (Afghanaid, 
ActionAid, Concern Worldwide and Save the 
Children) and a UN agency (UNEP). Together, 
the consortium tested the conflict analysis tool 
and is now integrating it into the continuation 
phase of its project. 
The second case (Box 3) presents the experience 
of a national NGO. Operating for almost three 
decades in the country, the organisation realised 
the need to integrate the risk of conflict in project 
planning and, based on that risk analysis, decide 
whether the project is feasible, or how it can be 
adapted to prevent conflict.
While the first two cases focus on working 
in conflict and doing no harm, the third case 
(Box 4) is of a project aiming to work on 
conflict. The ‘Forest restoration in Afghanistan’ 
project is commissioned by the German Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) and implemented by GIZ. The project 
aims to address forest degradation, and in doing 
so to work on conflict dynamics by establishing 
committees and procedures that directly focus on 
the management or resolution of conflict.
The three cases presented here highlight the 
relevance and impact of micro and meso conflict 
dynamics on the design and development of DRR 
projects, and the need to be actively aware of 
their existence and address them as appropriate. 
Although the terminology sometimes differs, 
interviewees and interventions largely infer a 
do no harm approach, using various different 
conflict analysis tools or assessments that allow 
project staff to design or adjust project design in 
a way that is conflict-sensitive. Each case takes 
a slightly different approach. The first case, 
ARC, presents arguably a more comprehensive 
set of tools to assess conflict and adapt project 
implementation, while the third, of GIZ, seeks 
not only to prevent but also to address conflict 
directly via the development of committees to 
engage in issues of land rights, access and use.
Tools and strategies which encourage greater 
awareness of conflict dynamics within DRR 
project design and delivery are intended to 
encourage more conflict-sensitive approaches 
to reducing disaster risk. Greater attention is 
paid not only to the broader societal context 
in which projects are being delivered, but also 
to the social conflict dynamics present within 
any society. Such ambitions and approaches 
are relatively new and undocumented within 
the DRR community of practice, and the 
organisations trialling them. Over time, it will 
be necessary to review how feasible they were to 
implement, how useful the information gathered 
was and the extent to which that information 
informed and altered project ambitions and 
delivery approaches. Doing so will help deepen 
a collective understanding of what specific 
modifications may need to be made to these 
tools so that they can be used by other projects 
and organisations.
31
Box 2 Afghanistan Resilience Consortium: including conflict analysis tools in DRR projects
The Afghanistan Resilience Consortium (ARC) was set up by Afghanaid, Actionaid, Save the 
Children, Concern and UNEP in 2014. In 2015, with support from DFID, the ARC began its 
first project, entitled ‘Strengthening the resilience of Afghanistan’s vulnerable communities 
against natural disasters’ (SRACAD).
The consortium implemented DRR and climate change adaptation interventions across the 
country, reaching 705 local communities in 29 districts. DRR activities focused on building 
community-based DRR infrastructure, including floodwater retention and protection walls. 
Another component is community- and school-based disaster preparedness, including the 
provision of emergency kits and training. The project also provided institutional capacity 
strengthening for disaster planning, supporting ANDMA, NDMC, the Ministry of Education 
and other institutions with DRR responsibilities. Finally, the project aimed to develop research 
and advocacy on DRR at the national and subnational levels. 
Analysing and understanding conflict
The ARC, together with Oxfam Novib, decided to conduct a DRR research project seeking 
to ‘understand the ways in which the implementation of community-based DRR projects 
can prevent, mitigate and manage social conflict’ (Mena, 2018b: 2). The rationale behind the 
research was that, since they have been able to implement DRR projects amid conflict, staff are 
likely to have developed good practice which could be documented, analysed and shared.
The findings highlighted that projects can be a source of social conflict, but there was no 
toolbox or established method to assist project teams in identifying potential conflicts related to 
interventions, and certainly none specific to DRR or to Afghanistan. The research also found cases 
where projects had been suspended or moved to nearby locations or neighbouring districts because 
of an escalation of tensions over resources, leadership or others factors that could not be resolved.
ARC and Oxfam set out to develop conflict analysis tools with a specific focus on DRR in 
Afghanistan, to assess the risk of conflict and adapt interventions accordingly. The Manual on 
conflict analysis tools: preventing, mitigating and reducing the risk of social conflict in civil DRR 
projects (Mena and ARC, 2018) combines multiple conflict analysis tools (including Mapping 
Stakeholder Relationships, the Conflict Tree and Connectors and Dividers) and adapts them to 
the Afghan context. Prior to its publication, the tool was tested in multiple provinces.
Since 2018, the manual has been used to train staff members and some government officials 
to increase their awareness of conflict-sensitive approaches. ARC has also made it mandatory to 
apply the tools in the development of its projects.
Addressing conflict
During an interview, the ARC manager stated that ‘we have a commitment to do no harm’.  
The approach is explicitly not oriented towards conflict resolution or peacebuilding, but rather  
‘[t]he objective of these tools is to produce information regarding people’s perceptions and 
contexts that can help in adjusting ARC programmes to reduce the risk of social conflict’.
The manual also addresses the question of what happens when social conflict occurs 
nonetheless. Traditional ARC DRR projects address conflict via ‘the involvement of both formal 
and traditional authorities – chiefly CDC leaders and managers, provincial authorities, imams 
and elders. The role and relevance of traditional authorities, such as elders and imams, is 
highlighted for conflict management because ‘respect for the local culture, customs and beliefs 
was deemed very important’ to prevent conflict by ARC DRR staff members (Mena, 2018b: 15).
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Box 2 Afghanistan Resilience Consortium: including conflict analysis tools in DRR projects (cont’d)
Second phase
A continuation of the project started on November 2018, funded by SIDA. The project, 
‘Community based eco disaster risk reduction (CBDR)’, was developed based on learning from 
the SRACAD project. With a duration of 30 months, the project explicitly includes conflict 
assessment and the use of the tools developed in the previous phase. For example, the project log 
frame explicitly includes the use of conflict assessment tools and adapting the project based on 
the results. The project also has specific indicators for measuring conflict-sensitive interventions 
at the community level. These include the level of knowledge of conflict analysis among field 
staff, enhanced through training; the number of government officials trained; and the number of 
communities for which conflict assessments have been completed.
The project aims to work in conflict – do no harm – while also working on conflict in cases 
where conflicts occur.
Box 3 COAR: DRR projects adopting do no harm principles
The Afghan NGO COAR was established in 1989. The organisation is active in development 
and humanitarian programmes in every region of the country. Its DRR profile (PreventionWeb, 
2018) indicates that it is active in the DRR Working Group, has implemented several DRR 
projects, including the establishment of a Disaster Management department at Sharq University,1 
and is involved in risk assessment and early warning.
COAR has been implementing DRR projects since 2003, beginning with Community Based 
Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM), with financial support from Christian Aid and technical 
support from the Sustainable Environment and Ecological Development Society of India (SEEDS 
India). As noted by engineer Abdul Halim Halim, Managing Director of COAR, when it was 
established the project was innovative: ‘The word of DRR was very new in Afghanistan. After 
the Taliban collapse and the new government, with support [from the] international community, 
there were huge levels of financial assistance for Afghanistan. The concepts of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction were most common among the international players, but the word of DRR was 
not. This was something new for ANGOs, INGOs and UN agencies. That was wonderful and 
really meaningful for us to start working on that’.
In 2017 and 2018, COAR implemented a DRR project with financial support from WFP. 
The project, entitled ‘Integrated community based disaster risk reduction for rural livelihood 
and agriculture development’, focused on Bamyan and Kabul provinces and targeted 
14,847 individuals, including people with disabilities and marginalised groups. The project 
focused on strengthening community-based institutions, enhancing livelihoods and building 
community resilience. It combined ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ components:
1. Hard component: building protection walls, wash culverts, small water-diversion dams;  
road construction.
2. Soft component: development of disaster management ‘clusters’ and providing short-term 
training on DRR; providing education and general awareness to communities about disasters, 
their effects, mitigation strategies and preparedness.
1 www.sharq.edu.af
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Box 3 COAR: DRR projects adopting do no harm principles (cont’d)
Analysing conflict
As presented in the project documents and stated during interviews, COAR has followed a do no 
harm principle in all stages of these projects:
Considering the social conflict and the way to deal with it is critical in every project, 
whereas it differs almost from place to place. We need to use specific methods to deal 
with project implementation in terms of conflict prevention and social disorders while 
considering do no harm  
(Managing Director, COAR).
To achieve this do no harm goal, the organisation has for over a decade used participatory 
approaches to ensure community participation in decision-making, in both the planning and 
implementation of projects. As presented by a COAR programme manager:
Our community-level participatory approach provides [for] wider participation of 
community members [in] the decision-making process at the community level, [the] 
majority of intervention plan[s are] implemented based on project plan[s] with … massive 
participation of community members to ensure community satisfaction [is] obtained, that 
help[s] COAR to avoid creat[ing] or exacerbate[ing] conflict within communities.
As part of the WFP project, COAR decided to formalise its risk assessments of social conflict, 
using a Risk Analysis and Response Plan (RARP) tool and survey. Based on a defined set of 
questions, and following discussions with multiple community members, COAR identified 
the main social and environmental risks associated with the development of the project, and 
assessed the level of each risk as high, medium or low.
If risks are considered high, there are four strategies to choose from:
 • Avoid – eliminate the threat by eliminating the cause.
 • Mitigate – identify ways to reduce the probability or impact of the risk.
 • Accept – nothing will be done. 
 • Transfer – make another party responsible for the risk (buy insurance, outsourcing, etc.).
In the case of Bamyan, the analysis revealed two main risks:
1. Delays in the transportation of food items as a result of roadblocks. 
2. The risk of conflict resulting from the choice of individuals to hire for the project.
Based on the RARP analysis, the first problem was discussed and addressed in collaboration with 
WFP. The second was addressed by the community shura, which allocated the work to the poorest 
and most vulnerable.
Addressing conflict
COAR does not work directly on conflict resolution or peacebuilding. Its RARP tool, following a 
do no harm approach, focuses on prevention and on being conflict-sensitive. Like ARC (Box 2), 
it addresses conflicts directly arising from the project – usually via elders, shuras and CDCs. The 
COAR country manager stated in an interview that it was usually possible to avoid conflict or 
adapt the project, based on three decades of experience working with Afghan communities:
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Box 3 COAR: DRR projects adopting do no harm principles (cont’d)
In implementing every project, do no harm has always been our priority action but 
what we have learnt so far is that [with] our experienced employees and our volunteers 
(who comprise between 40% to 50% of the project teams) and the help of influential 
individuals we successfully meet DRR objectives and prevention from conflict 
(Interview, COAR country manager).
On occasions conflict could not be prevented or addressed positively, and projects had to 
be suspended or implementation delayed. One of the main challenges lies in designing and 
implementing projects in areas where the organisation has no history of working in those locations.
Box 4 GIZ: including conflict analysis tools in forest restoration
The project ‘Wiederherstellung von Waldlandschaften in Afghanistan’ (Forest landscape 
restoration in Afghanistan) brings together DRR and climate change adaptation strategies and 
ecosystem conservation. The main focus is addressing the degradation of forests in Afghanistan 
through a community-based forest management approach in five provinces. The regeneration 
of forested areas is intended to protect livelihoods, and is accompanied by work to build local, 
regional and national structures to resolve conflicts connected to land use and ownership.
The project is based on experience gained from previous projects, including the diversification 
of agriculture in Baghlan province (2010), which used ‘Peace and Conflict Analysis’ to identify 
potential conflicts. Starting in February 2019, the project will conduct an ‘on-the-ground’ 
analysis in villages chosen as project sites.
The project’s contribution to reducing disaster risk includes planting trees on hillsides 
prone to landslides. By securing existing areas of agricultural land and creating livelihood 
opportunities, it also aims to reduce vulnerability. Project staff have committed to liaising closely 
with the ‘Disaster Prevention Badakhshan’ project, funded by GIZ/BMZ, to strengthen the 
capacity of government institutions responsible for disaster prevention in Badakhshan by using 
risk maps for analysing endangered areas, training relevant actors and undertaking small-scale 
infrastructure work to secure villages, property and basic infrastructure.
Analysing conflict
The project is designed to address social conflict, acknowledging that land rights and rights to 
land use (as well as water management) are difficult to address because of overlapping (and 
contradicting) claims. The process of clarifying land use rights rekindles underlying conflicts 
between individuals and communities. To identify and address these, the project proposes 
participatory processes, including involving local civil society representatives in decision-making. 
Land use plans are created through a participatory process, and in close cooperation with 
traditional groups such as shuras, jirgas and mirabs.1
Addressing conflict
The project aims to address the potential for conflict in two ways: first, by focusing on the 
development of concepts and strategies for conflict resolution related to the management of pastoral 
areas, reforestation and water management – for example, through rotation of pastoral grounds 
1 Jirga is a traditional assembly of leaders (usually elders) that makes decisions by consensus. Mirab can be an 
individual or group in charge of water management at the community level. The mirab is also called ‘water master’.
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4.3 Consideration of disaster risk 
within peacebuilding strategies
Section 4 explores how DRR projects seek to 
understand conflict dynamics within a project 
site, and how to deliver projects in ways that 
avoid doing harm. This can also be reversed: 
are peacebuilding and conflict resolution or 
management strategies taking into account 
natural hazard-related disaster risk?
A detailed review of peacebuilding, conflict 
management and resolution strategies was 
beyond the scope of this research, but it is worth 
noting that the relevance of linking disaster 
risk, natural resource management and conflict 
is well articulated. Take the example of water 
management (UNEP, 2013: 22): 
The first challenge [is] to manage 
increased demand for water; the second 
is to cope with the water-related 
disasters (floods and droughts) that are 
predicted to become more frequent and 
intense as a result of climate change; 
and the third is to build – or perhaps 
rebuild – water-related infrastructure 
7 These include Rabbani (2018), UN-Habitat (2016), Quie (2012), Uesugi (2009), Suhrke (2002) and multiple news and 
articles from the Afghanistan Analyst Network website, the Norwegian Refugee Council website, the Afghanistan Public 
Policy Research Organization website, the Diplomat newspaper and the New York Times.
for agriculture, water storage, and 
hydroelectric energy production in 
ways that do not increase local and 
cross-border tensions.
The practitioners, donors and policy-makers 
interviewed felt that peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution and management strategies and 
programmes rarely take DRR into account. 
This perspective was reinforced by a review of 
multiple project plans, strategies, documents 
and official statements, which revealed scant 
attention to disaster risk or the relationship 
between disaster and conflict risks.7 It should 
be noted, however, that most peacebuilding 
projects in Afghanistan work on macro-level 
conflict dynamics. The other two levels that are 
identified as most relevant to DRR – namely the 
meso and micro levels – receive far less attention 
in peacebuilding and conflict management and 
resolution programmes.
A notable exception are interventions that 
work on conflict and peacebuilding at the micro 
level through school programmes and natural 
resource management – such as the forest 
restoration project described above (Box 4). 
Box 4 GIZ: including conflict analysis tools in forest restoration (cont’d)
or better water distribution. The development of these methodologies is seen as supporting the 
sustainable regeneration of designated forested areas. Second, the project aims to establish multi-
stakeholder committees that can function as access points for mediating potential conflicts.
Ambitions for the first phase, running until the end of 2019, include the establishment of 
Natural Resource Management Committees in 20 villages, originating from CDCs. Traditional 
shuras and jirgas may also be included in this process. These platforms are designed to allow 
stakeholders to network, participate in decision-making processes and encourage ownership, 
which – it is hoped – will reduce the potential for conflict. In addition to measures and 
mechanisms that may prevent conflicts from arising, the project intends to explore ways to 
resolve conflicts that do occur.
At the provincial level, the Provincial Departments of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock will be supported by the establishment of multi-stakeholder working 
groups, similar to those at national level. These structures are geared towards reducing conflict 
at the local level and giving marginalised members of the community (women, ethnic minorities, 
etc.) the opportunity to express their views.
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5 Operational 
considerations for 
delivering DRR projects 
in conflict contexts
Bringing together the experiences, lessons and 
ideas from the three project examples (Section 4) 
and the interviews for this study, this section 
highlights a number of themes related to the 
operational delivery of DRR projects in contexts 
of conflict. These themes are far from exhaustive 
and many are not solely a challenge for DRR, 
but affect development and service delivery more 
broadly. Nonetheless, they are presented here with 
a view to indicating where further consideration 
is required on the part of the DRR community of 
practice operating in conflict situations. 
5.1 The legacy of hazard-centred 
approaches
The three project examples (Section 4) can 
be interpreted as representing a new trend in 
approaches to DRR in Afghanistan. Previous 
projects were characterised by hazard-focused 
infrastructural approaches to rapid-onset disasters. 
Compared with these previous interpretations of 
DRR, the examples presented in this study differ 
because of the explicit consideration of conflict 
dynamics in their design; many interventions 
take a holistic approach, considering all key 
aspects of the construction of disaster risk – 
hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities; many 
aim to strengthen the operational capacity of 
local authorities; and many seek to address the 
root causes of hazards such as deforestation and 
land degradation. 
The new trend derives from lessons on what 
works and what doesn’t in delivering DRR 
results in conflict contexts. It also results from 
responses to donor trends. There has been 
increased interest in promoting an integrated 
approach to risks, whereby DRR can be linked 
to other topics including climate change, 
development and education. For agencies in 
Afghanistan, there is an incentive to adopt broad 
approaches as this facilitates the continuation of 
operations. Several participants from the UN and 
INGOs, as well as one donor, mentioned how 
this fits with their need for programmes to keep 
working and to retain offices and staff.
Previous approaches to DRR were more 
technical in nature and focused on infrastructure 
improvements, and were historically oriented 
towards sudden-onset disasters like earthquakes 
and floods. It has been suggested in other 
contexts that a technocratic approach to disasters 
can be tactical, in order to avoid being seen as 
political (Peters, 2017). In Afghanistan, actors 
denied this when asked, and pointed out that 
conflict is so omnipresent that addressing it 
openly is acceptable and expected. The hazard-
centred approach, in their view, was related more 
to a lack of knowledge on DRR – specifically 
how vulnerabilities and capacities fit into the 
construction of disaster risk (see Figure 1). An 
infrastructural approach resonated with the 
routine projects of many agencies, and had the 
advantage of producing visible and measurable 
37
results (especially important in the years when 
field monitoring was not possible and, hence, 
visuals of project outcomes were required – 
see the next section). Most projects had to 
learn DRR ‘on the job’. While it is tempting 
to explain the challenges of delivering DRR 
projects in conflict areas solely in relation to the 
operational difficulties that conflict presents, it 
is also important to recognise that DRR is itself 
a technical approach that requires capacity-
building and training. In many locations this 
foundational knowledge is lacking.
Although there is an emergent trend towards 
new approaches, previous more technocratic 
methods still dominate in practice, including 
among DRR specialists or practitioners. Most 
people working on DRR in Afghanistan ‘learnt by 
doing’ while implementing projects. While some 
individuals received formal training from external 
consultants, this too can be oriented specifically 
towards project implementation, and may 
reinforce a narrow interpretation of DRR. For 
example, most interviewees, reports and policies 
continue to refer to ‘natural disasters’ despite the 
fact that this is widely regarded as problematic 
among the DRR community of practice. 
A technocratic approach also colours 
perceptions of DRR in the wider aid community. 
Conversations with development and 
humanitarian specialists not working on disaster-
related topics revealed their perception of DRR 
as a technical and mechanical process with no 
relevance to political and social factors. One 
DRR specialist said that ‘DRR groups are really 
small and we know of each other’s activities, 
but outsiders don’t know about us’. The lack of 
knowledge of disasters in the wider development 
community may be a factor in why programmes 
addressing conflict rarely take natural hazards 
into account, as observed in section 4.3.
5.2 Corruption and accountability
Problems of corruption or lack of accountability 
were regularly mentioned in the interviews and 
stated in some policy documents. Afghanistan 
ranks 172nd out of 180 countries on the 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency 
International, 2018). Participants frequently 
referred to corruption not in direct relation to 
DRR, but as part of the wider political economy 
in which aid operates. As presented by one 
INGO staff member in a focus group discussion 
in Badakhshan Province:
[t]here is much corruption and 
also money that disappears. When 
something happens, money and relief 
items are sent from Kabul, but here all 
that is taken by someone. Some things 
are used for the people, others used by 
them, but you can also see that food 
and other items are sold in the market 
or they appear later as hand-outs from 
authorities that want to show they are 
doing good.
Funds and items to be used in disaster 
management and risk reduction may be 
embezzled or used for non-humanitarian or 
non-disaster-related purposes. Donors stress 
that they maintain a zero-tolerance policy in 
these situations (they will cancel funding in 
cases where corruption or misappropriation of 
resources is identified), but they can only assess 
what the implementing organisation reports to 
them. Insecurity was frequently mentioned as the 
main factor preventing donors from conducting 
monitoring field visits.
Although corruption is undeniably a 
challenge, information on corruption frequently 
involved second-hand testimonies, rumours 
and distortions. When respondents were asked, 
the majority indicated that the examples they 
gave were based on information from others. 
This does not negate the realities presented 
by Transparency International (2018), but it 
does contribute to an atmosphere of mistrust, 
hindering efforts to advance DRR in the country. 
As stated by a UN agency manager interviewed:
[t]hey [government authorities] do not 
have the mechanism and capacity to 
monitor what is happening on the field 
level, therefore all their reports are 
based on assumptions. We use them but 
we always need to reasses and double 
check the information. [At] the end of 
the day, we depend on our own reports 
and we just have to trust that what they 
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said they did is true, although many 
times is not. You know, there is much 
corruption and lack of transparency.
Specifically for DRR, the issue was raised that 
infrastructure (like bridges, walls, buildings) that 
is not checked may give a false sense of security 
and protection. Who certifies the flood protection/
containment walls and other mitigation structures 
is a recurring concern. Every organisation 
implementing projects works with engineers and 
trusts their professional capabilities. However, 
three engineering inspectors interviewed for this 
project all mentioned a lack of clear building 
codes, regulations and specifications to inspect 
against. In practice, there have been cases 
where lack of access to proper materials or to 
implementation sites has resulted in structures that 
were not built according to initial specifications, 
but which were labelled as ‘properly constructed 
[as long as] they did not look likely to fall down’ 
(interview with an INGO).
5.3 Problems of access
Limited access to parts of the country due to 
insecurity was repeatedly cited as a significant 
obstacle to effectively delivering DRR projects. 
Accessing areas where DRR projects are 
being implemented, especially remote areas, 
is problematic as routes are often blocked or 
dangerous owing to conflict, insecurity and, in 
some seasons, hazards such as flooding. Armed 
opposition groups might control parts of a 
route or the area around project sites or attack 
project staff and property, and checkpoints 
may be installed which can be unsafe to cross. 
Insecurity is not solely down to armed groups, 
but can also be due to bandits and groups 
related to the drug industry, who control certain 
routes and territories. Finally, as mentioned by 
one DRR project manager, ‘the government can 
also be difficult. They close the route saying 
that [it] is dangerous or not good to go and 
we lose our access. You know, even if we have 
talk with the Taliban and they allow us to go, 
the government say that we can’t’. During field 
visits to remote areas where DRR projects were 
being implemented, one Afghan NGO manager 
affirmed that ‘access sometimes is out of our 
control, like when [it] snows, but usually is more 
about power’. According to this interviewee, 
groups (which may be affiliated with the 
government, the armed opposition or others) 
may block access for NGOs to prevent aid from 
being delivered to some territories in order to 
demonstrate power and weaken opponents. 
Although this type of manipulation is not limited 
to DRR projects, the fact that DRR is primarily 
implemented by NGOs and UN actors frequently 
resulted in it being framed as an aid concern 
subject to the problems and constraints that the 
aid sector faces in Afghanistan; without the direct 
involvement of the government in interventions, 
DRR is rarely considered a government concern 
or part of a broader set of public services. 
Respondents also felt that their area of work 
was less attractive as local authority figures 
would find it easier to accept the need for 
medicine than for longer-term risk reduction. 
Negotiating access for DRR projects also takes 
longer than for projects that are better-known 
(like education, water provision or health), 
because explanations have to be provided 
repeatedly, to a variety of actors. 
Access issues also affect monitoring and 
evaluation. Monitoring of projects by managers 
is often impossible because in the vast majority 
of cases these staff are foreigners – and thus 
one of the main targets for kidnapping (OCHA, 
2018a). This also poses challenges for donors. 
One donor funding DRR projects in Afghanistan 
mentioned that expertise was in practice less 
important when assessing whether to fund a 
project than having an implementing partner 
they knew and trusted:
Because I can’t go to see if they are 
doing what they say they have done, it 
need to trust, but you cannot trust in 
[an] organisation or people that you do 
not know. When we start working with 
[an] organisation that we have never 
[worked with] before, we spend a lot of 
time [getting to know] each other and 
building this trust.
As DRR projects are implemented in areas of 
high disaster risk, it is also important to note the 
role played by the weather and road conditions. 
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Many disaster-prone areas are not accessible for 
long stretches due to snow, landslides or fog, 
and according to many interviewees weather 
conditions account for most project delays. 
Poor road conditions also affect access, meaning 
that trips that are relatively short in terms 
of distance can take an extremely long time. 
Poorly maintained roads and transport links 
are compounded by the impact of conflict and 
governance limitations, a challenge mentioned 
repeatedly by interviewees. 
5.4 Prolonged duration and the 
need for flexibility
In view of the complex logistics, bureaucratic 
hurdles, challenging weather conditions and 
changeable security situation, respondents 
strongly felt that the planning and initial 
implementation of projects take much more 
time than would be required in more stable 
contexts. As mentioned by an INGO manager 
implementing DRR projects, ‘you need to 
be prepared to take time, because here [it] 
will take [a long time] to get all the papers, 
permits and reach the communities and start 
working’. These challenges were recognised by 
all actors, including donors. Moreover, many 
respondents with multi-country experience felt 
that DRR projects in Afghanistan take longer 
to be implemented than in other settings they 
knew of, owing in part to the time required 
to complete administrative and bureaucratic 
permissions to undertake a project and gain 
access to the community, the time required to 
gain the trust and acceptance of communities 
and other stakeholders and the time it takes 
to reach agreement on the specifics of project 
interventions. Similar findings have been 
documented with regard to humanitarian and 
disaster-response projects in other conflict 
contexts (Mena, 2018a).
The need for lengthy preparation and 
implementation time is more pronounced in 
programmes that explicitly aim to work in (do 
no harm) or on (addressing) conflict. Assessing 
and understanding the tensions that may exist 
8 This point was made by an INGO staff member, but the meeting was not recorded at the request of the interviewee, for 
security reasons.
in a community takes time and care. As one 
INGO programme manager put it: ‘there are 
too many things to see: the differences that they 
have, the problems the projects can create, and 
also the problems that exist between different 
communities’. The case of the ARC (Box 2) 
demonstrates the steps involved in preparation 
and training, all of which takes time. The proper 
use of tools for conflict assessment requires the 
collection of information from different groups 
of people at different times. All these steps 
require preparation and resources, and confront 
the same challenges of access and insecurity that 
a project as a whole faces. Properly assessing and 
including conflict-sensitivity measures in DRR 
programmes takes time and effort. However, as 
stated by a social worker implementing these 
tools and DRR projects, taking shortcuts in these 
preparations is likely to result in delays due to 
increased tension. A lack of preparation could 
even, in some cases, lead to the cancellation 
of a project.8 In a similar vein, participants 
argued that gaining access, understanding 
the local context and obtaining government 
authorisations and other administrative tasks 
not only take longer in Afghanistan, but also 
require flexibility and patience on the part of 
implementing organisations.
The complex interaction of micro, meso 
and macro conflict dynamics, coupled 
with the country’s geography and weather 
variability, create an environment where, 
according to one project manager, ‘things 
never happened as planned’. Yet the ability to 
be flexible in how projects are delivered and 
their expected outcomes is often limited by 
the timebound project duration, expectations 
of various stakeholders to deliver pre-agreed 
project outcomes, and financial constraints, 
including pre-approval of any budgetary 
changes by the donor. Many interviewees felt 
that these discussions can be complicated by 
the environment of corruption and lack of 
transparency, where changes to costings can 
be viewed with scepticism. Local and national 
NGOs, especially, found this aspect of their work 
very challenging.
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In view of these issues of duration and 
flexibility, participants pointed to the need to 
extend planning and funding cycles beyond one 
year. Donors also raised this as a challenge, and 
some discussed providing multi-year funding 
and programming. One way of dealing with the 
challenges of planning for multiple years in a 
constantly changing environment is to divide a 
project into phases, with continuation contingent 
on achievements in the previous phase.
5.5 Intersectionality, disabilities 
and human mobility 
‘One-size-fits all’ approaches are increasingly 
being called into question. More attention is 
needed to assess the differentiated nature of 
vulnerability, and to create a more nuanced 
picture which recognises that, although social 
groups are often brought together under the 
umbrella terms of ‘vulnerable’ or ‘marginalised’, 
this risks overlooking the specific barriers 
facing individuals (Chaplin et al., 2019). 
Moreover, individuals often have multiple 
disadvantages, which may compound and 
complicate their experience of vulnerability 
(ibid.). Recognising these complexities provides 
one way of introducing social heterogeneity into 
considerations of how vulnerabilities to disaster 
risk are constructed. Such ambitions can seek 
to unravel the explicit and implicit assumptions 
about pre-defined social categories, and to enable 
policies and programmes to be more inclusive 
and ensure ‘no one is left behind’ as championed 
by Agenda 2030 and echoed in the Sendai 
Framework (Chaplin et al., 2019). 
In Afghanistan, gendered impacts on 
vulnerability have been recognised in DRR and 
other policy documents, and projects such as those 
by the ARC and COAR (discussed above) show 
an awareness of women’s heightened vulnerability 
to violence and political marginalisation. The 
concept of an intersectional approach does 
not seek to reduce the relevance or importance 
of gender considerations, but emphasises that 
gender is not a single analytical category – for 
men or women (Carson et al., 2013). A narrowly 
framed gender analysis of vulnerability – as often 
employed in project proposals in Afghanistan – is 
considered less effective than taking a broader 
approach encompassing a wide range of social  
and cultural identities (Djoudi, 2016). For 
example, women should not be seen as a 
homogenous group on account of intersectionality 
with class, caste, religion and age, among 
other factors which will affect their access to 
DRR-related resources, rights and adaptation 
capabilities. Reductionist framings of patriarchy 
in conflict situations are similarly challenged 
by considerations of men’s differentiated class, 
religious and educational status. More critical 
consideration is needed of the use of the distinct 
social categories often employed in developmental 
policy and the dynamic interrelated qualities that 
constitute identities, and for their inclusion in 
discussions of disaster and conflict vulnerability, 
adaptation and resilience in Afghanistan. 
An intersectional approach thus offers more 
nuance than traditionally employed in DRR 
programmes by taking contextual realities into 
account, and recognises that people experiencing 
marginalisation have different identities, needs 
and priorities. Multiple factors interact to 
shape an individual’s social position, and their 
experience of vulnerability (Osborne, 2015). In 
the context of disasters and conflict, this could 
include different experiences of violence and 
conflict – from interpersonal violence through 
to living under an armed opposition group, and 
related differentiated psychosocial needs. 
Intersectionality will also shape the experience 
of vulnerability felt by people with disabilities. As 
Twigg et al. (2018: 3) state: 
Disasters have a disproportionate impact 
on people with disabilities, who are 
at higher risk of death, injury and loss 
of property … People with disabilities 
(physical, psychological and cognitive) 
are also more likely to be poor or 
unemployed, socially marginalised, 
excluded from decision-making 
processes and living in hazardous 
locations in poor housing and with 
inadequate infrastructure and limited 
access to basic services. Disasters can be 
a significant cause of permanent injuries 
and impairments, and can exacerbate 
pre-existing conditions through the loss 
of equipment or medication. 
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No indication of these interrelated identities was 
found in DRR (or other) policies and frameworks. 
This is a major oversight given the compounding 
factors of identity, which produce multiple and 
varied forms of vulnerability. This is especially 
relevant in Afghanistan, where landmines, suicide 
attacks and battlefield injuries result in many 
disabilities, as well as ‘environmental factors 
including epidemics; accidents; natural disasters; 
and pollutions by poisoning and toxic waste all 
lead to causing impairments’ (Government of 
Afghanistan, 2003a).
Finally, evidence collated for this report, 
together with a review of literature on DRR 
in conflict-affected areas (Peters et al., 2019a), 
brings out a number of issues relevant to DRR 
and conflict in Afghanistan, not all of which 
have received systematic attention in DRR 
programming. These include the need to advance 
the application of DRR approaches to the 
disaster–conflict–urban nexus, including but 
not limited to human mobility and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). 
In Afghanistan, displacement due to conflict, 
disaster and poverty has resulted in people 
moving to urban areas, with the consequent 
expansion of informal settlements without 
sufficient planning, adherence to building codes 
or provision of adequate services. The lack or 
reduced application of building codes and the 
informality of settlements increase the exposure 
and vulnerability of the inhabitants and the 
likelihood that disasters will occur, as well as 
increasing the risks of social conflict. Current 
DRR programmes are, however, geared mainly 
to rural areas. There are also concerns that these 
programmes fail to take adequate account of 
issues related to refugees, IDPs and returnees. 
This is a significant problem in Afghanistan, 
where in 2018 alone drought resulted in the 
displacement of more than 275,000 people 
(OCHA, 2018b). 
5.6 Climate change and climate 
variability 
Climate change and climate variability were 
repeatedly cited as a critical cross-cutting topic 
that should be taken into consideration in 
the preparation of and justification for DRR 
projects. In the three projects reviewed in detail 
(Section 3), each makes reference to the links 
between natural hazards and climate changes, 
and the links between DRR and climate change 
adaptation. This seems to be a trend repeated 
across interventions in the country, and reflects 
growing evidence on current and future impacts. 
Government, UN agency and World Bank reports 
have all shown how climate change might affect 
Afghanistan, with the main concern the risk of 
more severe or recurrent droughts and floods due 
to changes in rainfall and temperature patterns 
(NEPA and UNEP, 2015; WFP et al., 2016; World 
Bank and GFDRR, 2017). This is echoed in a 
report from UNEP (2013: 4), which warns that 
‘disputes over water and land were the two most 
commonly reported reasons for violent conflict’, 
and that climate-related disasters such as droughts 
and floods require more urgent attention. 
These reports are frequently cited in DRR 
project proposals and evaluations. In an 
interview, one donor also mentioned the country 
‘disaster risk profile’ (World Bank and GFDRR, 
2017) when explaining the relevance of climate 
change and the inclusion of DRR as part of the 
climate change agenda. Climate change is also 
cited as an important risk factor in national 
policy documents, including the Strategic 
Framework 2018–2028 (ANDMA, 2018c) or the 
previous SNAP (ANDMA, 2011): ‘Due to climate 
change, flood and drought risks are likely to 
increase in the future’ (ANDMA, 2018c: 13). 
While the government and aid organisations 
are recognising the importance of climate change 
in policy documents and project proposals, 
there is limited evidence of substantial action. 
Two of the projects studied here (Box 1 and 
Box 3) have a climate change focus in their 
proposals. These projects, and a former project 
by UNEP (see UNEP, 2016), are among the 
few where genuine action has been taken 
to link DRR and climate change beyond 
simply acknowledging or mentioning climate 
change as contextual information. One UNEP 
representative interviewed felt that more research 
and knowledge on the links between DRR and 
climate change in Afghanistan is needed, as 
well as stronger strategic coordination between 
government departments and agencies. Beyond 
the current and future impacts of climate 
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changes, links to the climate change agenda also 
offer financing opportunities, discussed below.
5.6.1 Climate finance opportunities for 
advancing DRR
Afghanistan is positioning itself as a country 
determined to fight climate change and adapt 
to its impacts. In 2015 it submitted its Intended 
National Determined Contribution9 (INDC) to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Supporting DRR approaches appears 
in this document as the first priority of climate 
change adaptation targets, outlining that, between 
2020 and 2030, $10.8 billion will be needed in 
adaptation finance.10
Adaptation finance therefore represents 
an important opportunity to advance DRR 
ambitions in Afghanistan. Climate Funds Update 
(CFU) data11 shows that the Least Developed 
Country Fund12 has been particularly active in 
Afghanistan, with four approved adaptation 
projects, for a total amount of $27 million, 
between 2004 and 2015, most of which aim to 
improve the country’s preparedness to climate-
induced disaster risks.
In 2016 Afghanistan submitted two concept 
notes to the Green Climate Fund13 (GCF), 
though at the time of writing neither had been 
9 In anticipation of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015, countries publicly 
outlined what post-2020 climate actions they intended to take under the new international agreement. These are known 
as INDCs (see www.wri.org/indc-definition).
10 www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Afghanistan/1/INDC_AFG_Paper_En_20150927_.
docx%20FINAL.pdf.
11 https://climatefundsupdate.org/.
12 The Least Developed Country Fund was established in 2002 under the UNFCCC (see www.thegef.org/about/funding).
13 The GCF, established under the UNFCCC at the end of 2011, aims to contribute to attaining the international community’s 
mitigation and adaptation goals. It is expected to become the main multilateral financing mechanism to support climate action 
in developing countries (see https://climatefundsupdate.org/the-funds/green-climate-fund/). 
14 www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/893456/15790_-_Enhancing_Climate_Resilience_in_the_Third_Pole.pdf/8e89f249-
619d-4678-aad2-910582c2104d.
15 www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/893456/14940_-_Solar_Plus_Diversified_Low-Carbon_Systems_to_Improve_
Energy_Supply_and_Climate_Resilience.pdf/ce65ab10-c8bb-44e6-aa20-b3a875bafe66.
16 www.adaptation-undp.org/afghanistan-launches-us71-million-initiative-prepare-rural-communities-climate-change. 
17 The amount in US dollars is not reported (see www.worldbank.org/en/programs/afghanistan-disaster-risk-management-
and-resilience-program#1).
approved. One focuses on developing climate 
services and early warning systems in the Hindu 
Kush-Himalayan region,14 and the other includes 
a component on climate-resilient agriculture.15 
Other recent initiatives include the approval in 
2017 of $71 million of investment to prepare 
rural communities for climate change, with a 
particular focus on women and marginalised 
groups. Activities include establishing community-
based early warning systems and working with 
subnational institutions to integrate climate change 
into planning. This is financed with a $5.6 million 
grant from the LDCF and co-financing from 
the Afghan government ($5 million), the Asian 
Development Bank ($57 million), the World Bank 
($2.5 million) and UNDP ($1 million).16 The World 
Bank is undertaking a comprehensive multi-hazard 
risk assessment at the national level, including 
in-depth assessments for selected geographic areas, 
with funding from the Global Facility for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and the Japanese government, in 
close cooperation with the ANDMA.17
Numerous activities have been promoted 
to help enhance DRR in Afghanistan, in 
particular around early warning systems and 
risk assessments. However, funding is not 
commensurate to needs. Beyond financing, other 
factors to consider in a fragile and conflict-affected 
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context such as Afghanistan include the need to 
build institutional capacity, simplify multilateral 
climate funds’ procedures to obtain accreditation 
and link project proposals to national policies on 
climate change and development.18
Over the past 18 months Afghanistan has made 
major strides in climate budgeting. The Ministry of 
Finance has worked with international partners to 
determine the degree to which the budgets of the 
three major ministries concerned are contributing 
to adaptation, with a view to increasing spending 
18 www.acclimatise.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ACT-Brief-11_hi-res-spread.pdf. 
on adaptation and mainstreaming this within 
existing government programmes. Similarly, 
Afghanistan has made progress in establishing an 
institutional architecture for soliciting international 
funds for adaptation through a dedicated Climate 
Finance Unit at the National Environmental 
Protection Agency. A grant has been secured from 
the GCF for readiness activities, commencing in 
January 2019. Many believe that, over time, this 
institutional strengthening could support DRR 
financing in the country. 
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6 Conclusion and 
recommendations
There is increasing recognition of the 
importance of DRR in Afghanistan, prompted 
in part by repeated disasters in the country’s 
recent history. Disaster casualties, disaster-
related displacement and affected populations 
in many parts of the country outnumber deaths 
and displacement related to conflict (OCHA, 
2018a: 4). DRR is therefore not a marginal 
concern, and certainly not one that can wait 
until sustainable peace is attained. 
The government has an important role to play 
in setting the policy agenda on DRR – aligned 
with international policy and standards such as 
the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015) – and 
delivering tangible disaster resilience outcomes 
(reduced loss of life and livelihoods) for its 
citizens. However, state-centric approaches are 
only feasible in government-held territories, and 
even there capacity is generally lacking. This is 
not to suggest that DRR is not happening. In 
many instances, the UN, INGOs and ANGOs are 
picking up the slack, implementing community-
level DRR activities despite significant 
operational barriers.
In general, DRR programming in Afghanistan 
by government and non-governmental actors 
has been hazard-oriented, infrastructure-focused 
and of relatively short duration. This reflects the 
political economy of the funding environment 
and perceptions of the nature of disasters and 
DRR. There have been a number of cases recently 
where DRR ambitions have matured – taking 
greater account of the relationship between 
hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities. Previously, 
DRR activities were rarely explicit about the 
ways in which they interacted with or addressed 
conflict conditions. The examples in this report 
show that this is starting to change, and that 
DRR can be pursued in contexts of conflict, from 
do no harm through to actively seeking to affect 
societal relations that result in conflict as part of 
project design. 
Different types of DRR actions may or may 
not be viable depending on the nature of conflict 
at different levels. In Afghanistan, as in most 
conflict contexts, central state institutions and the 
international community tend to focus on macro-
level conflict, whereas local-level manifestations 
of conflict can be much more important for 
programme implementation. Framing conflicts 
in Afghanistan only by their macro dimension 
hides the multiple causes of vulnerability and 
displacement (poverty, reduced access to public 
services and local conflicts), resulting in projects 
that may not adequately address the root causes 
of disasters.
The kind of social problems and conflicts 
associated with DRR projects – such as 
interfering in power politics, hierarchies and 
inequalities – are arguably common to DRR 
in every context. Thus, a conflict ‘lens’ has 
value beyond contexts explicitly labelled as 
‘conflict-affected’ or experiencing high-intensity 
conflict, and needs to be accounted for in the 
design of any intervention. Where DRR projects 
in high-intensity conflict contexts fail to take 
adequate consideration of conflict dynamics, 
it is highly likely that those projects will have 
been poorly designed and implementation may 
risk exacerbating or igniting social conflict. This 
in turn might aggravate the effects of disaster 
impacts or increase people’s vulnerability by 
creating a false sense of security. 
There are important distinctions between 
working around, in and on conflict. At the 
national level, DRR programming is mainly seen 
to work around areas not under the control of 
the government (macro conflict). Similarly, we 
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found that DRR programmes often position 
themselves as working around conflict at the 
provincial level. One notable exception is 
the GIZ project (Box 4), one component of 
which aims to strengthen conflict resolution 
mechanisms at provincial level – and, hence, 
seeks to work on conflict at that level.
At the community level, DRR programmes 
rarely take a systematic approach to integrating 
conflict dynamics. But there are exceptions, 
three of which are explored in this report. The 
NGO consortium ARC (Box 2) developed 
conflict-sensitivity tools and trained staff on 
how to prevent conflicts and address social 
conflicts when they occur in the everyday 
politics of project implementation. The second 
example (Box 3) concerns a national NGO that 
introduced (conflict) risk analysis approaches 
into its programmes. Finally, GIZ’s forest 
restoration programme integrates DRR and sets 
up conflict-resolution mechanisms at local and 
provincial levels (Box 4).
Based on these examples, there is appetite  
for moving towards more integrated approaches 
to DRR, specifically in terms of applying 
and adapting tools and training on conflict 
sensitivity. Future research could explore 
whether there is a reverse trend: i.e. whether 
peace- and conflict-related interventions take 
natural hazards or DRR into account. Anecdotal 
evidence together with interviews and a review 
of relevant documents suggests that this is not 
yet happening; disasters are a neglected topic  
in conflict, peace and stability policies, plans 
and approaches.
This paper sheds light on a number of challenges 
in contexts marked by constrained governance 
systems, insecurity and underdevelopment. These 
are not unique to conflict contexts but are all in 
some way exacerbated by conflict conditions, 
making the delivery of DRR interventions even 
more difficult in practice:
 • DRR is limited by hazard-centred 
approaches, which lack deeper consideration 
of the construction of disaster risk (Figure 1) 
and the role of violence and conflict within 
this. The predominance of infrastructural 
protection and mitigation measures for 
floods and earthquakes reflects this, as 
does a funding environment which favours 
short-term projects and visible deliverables. 
Although it may be unappealing for donors, 
there is still a need for basic training on the 
foundational concepts of DRR, helping to 
build skills, knowledge and capacity for a 
deeper understanding of the way disaster 
risks manifest.
 • DRR is hampered by problems of access. 
These are partly security-related, but will 
continue to play a role in view of the 
country’s difficult geography and often 
adverse weather conditions. Issues of 
corruption can lead to the diversion of funds 
or sub-standard project delivery, creating 
a false sense of security without actually 
reducing disaster risks. Greater effort is 
needed to develop better remote monitoring, 
utilising technologies to bridge the gap 
between donors and recipients and allow for 
demonstrable ‘results’ that are not (solely) 
centred on physical deliverables. 
 • DRR in Afghanistan requires long project 
durations and a flexible programming 
approach. Preparation time – and, hence, 
project overheads – are increased when 
a conflict-sensitive approach is explicitly 
adopted, because this may require additional 
staff training and on-site risk assessments. 
That said, interviews with project staff 
suggest that such measures can reduce the 
likelihood of delays or cancellations. Donors 
should make conflict-sensitive processes 
compulsory in project design and delivery, 
and allow budgets to be allocated to training 
and conflict analysis as required. 
The research identified a number of intersecting 
issues that need to be addressed as part of 
comprehensive DRR programming. The 
relationship between DRR and climate change 
is an obvious intersection and has received 
increased attention in Afghanistan from 
practitioners and donors. The effects of climate 
change, in particular water availability, are 
seen as causing local-level conflict, as well as 
increasing disaster risk. The integration of 
climate change adaptation and DRR is receiving 
attention, but has not yet evolved sufficiently 
in policy or practice. Nor does the climate 
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change community fare much better in terms 
of systematically integrating considerations 
of conflict into project design and delivery. 
Lessons from the DRR community should be 
more systematically documented and shared to 
strengthen the evidence base for what conflict-
sensitive climate change adaptation programmes 
could entail. The political attention and financial 
opportunities afforded by the issue of climate 
change could offer means to leverage greater 
institutional capabilities for action on climate-
related disasters.
Finally, implementing DRR projects with a 
conflict-sensitive approach is deemed positive 
and necessary by all actors. With an awareness of 
working in conflict situations, the current focus of 
DRR actors is do no harm. In practice, however, 
this often requires working on conflicts – namely, 
conflicts that may emerge (directly or indirectly) 
from the everyday politics of DRR projects in 
interaction with the wider political economy. 
Do no harm has historically been approached 
in an intuitive way, but there is an evolving range 
of tools, approaches and experiences pointing 
to the need for a more systematic approach to 
the consideration of conflict dynamics in DRR 
project design, delivery and monitoring. Having 
tools to assess conflict is not enough, and there 
was wide agreement among interviewees that 
conflict-sensitive DRR requires more sustained 
training and capacity development at different 
levels of disaster risk governance, with special 
attention to the local and provincial levels.
6.1 Recommendations
There is a clear call to accelerate action on DRR 
in Afghanistan, as revealed through interviews 
with affected communities, practitioners, policy-
makers and donors alike. What is less clear are 
the parameters, approaches, entry points and 
adaptations required to conventional approaches 
to DRR to ensure that efforts are viable and 
appropriate, timely, sustainable and ultimately 
do no harm. Moreover, the barriers associated 
with implementing DRR programmes in high-
intensity conflict – real and perceived – are yet to 
be removed. 
The project-based experiences highlighted in 
this research reveal that DRR in high-intensity 
conflict requires a substantial investment of 
time, and is more expensive compared to similar 
projects in other countries or contexts. These 
trade-offs are arguably counteracted by the 
benefits of actively including conflict sensitivity 
and prevention measures in operational 
approaches to adapt DRR interventions to the 
specific circumstances of the contexts at hand.
Contrary to expectations, the macro-level 
conflict was not routinely cited as a significant 
barrier to the pursuit of DRR on the ground. 
While the national conflict and geopolitical 
implications undoubtedly presented challenges, 
such as access to funding, insufficient and 
ineffective disaster risk governance, these are 
worked around by agencies and operations. 
What is a cause for concern – in the cases 
investigated here – are the micro- and meso-level 
conditions of conflict, prompting adaptations to 
conventional DRR approaches that are better 
suited to the overarching context of high-
intensity conflict.
Action on DRR needs to be significantly scaled 
up in order to protect citizens from current and 
future disaster risk, and in a way that responds 
to the specific conditions of high-intensity 
conflict. This means a number of different things: 
from including the dynamics of conflict in 
vulnerability assessments to adapting operational 
approaches to protect staff working in insecure 
areas. The following recommendations point to 
opportunities for advancing DRR in Afghanistan 
in ways that are conflict-sensitive. 
 • Use a vulnerability lens to advance the 
development of tools and methods that allow 
effective assessment of risks present at micro 
and meso levels, with explicit emphasis on 
the intersection between natural hazard and 
conflict vulnerabilities. Such tools could 
be developed through action research with 
existing DRR working groups, to build 
on their experiences of DRR in meso- and 
micro-level conflict contexts. In time, it may 
be feasible to develop recommendations to 
take greater consideration of high-intensity 
conflict in local- to national-level DRR 
strategies and plans of action. 
 • There is a need to further develop conceptual 
and operational approaches which improve 
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the integration of DRR with actions designed 
to reduce the risk of, or avoid exacerbating, 
conflict. The manual developed by the ARC 
(Mena and ARC, 2018) as part of its DRR 
project (see Box 2) shows the relevance of 
adapting existing tools to the national and 
local context. It also shows the importance 
of funding and promoting research into 
such initiatives, as the current evidence base 
remains limited.
 • Current and future DRR programmes, 
especially those supported by international 
donors, should move beyond short-term 
timeframes to allow projects to build on 
ideas of adaptive programming (Valters et 
al., 2016) to enable lessons to be internalised 
and used to shape and adjust project design. 
Through the financing of medium- and 
long-term projects, it may also be possible 
to develop monitoring systems which, with 
suitable donor flexibility, can provide room 
for adapting project aims and ambitions to 
flex in response to changing external (conflict) 
conditions. Creating multi-year funding 
specifically for DRR is a necessary first step, 
as is scoping the feasibility of a multi-donor 
trust fund to strengthen government action 
on DRR at scale. 
 • The examples presented here reveal the 
relevance and added value of pursuing DRR 
approaches in the context of a high-intensity 
conflict, and that it is possible to develop 
approaches that explicitly seek to reduce 
the risk of conflict. Developing these ideas 
and practices further could help nuance and 
deepen our collective understanding of what 
types of disaster and peace outcomes can be 
aligned and what practices can be integrated, 
under what circumstances and to what benefit, 
and specifically what ambitions for conflict 
prevention or peacebuilding are viable and 
compatible with ambitions for DRR. 
 • Increased capacity for DRR is required at the 
provincial and local level through subnational 
government institutions, including specifically 
designated DRR officers charged with 
delivering on current DRR policies and plans. 
While a shift is required from a focus on 
disaster impact mitigation and community-
based preparedness to risk reduction and 
prevention, there is also a need to avoid 
technocratic approaches to risk reduction. 
Effort will need to be made to inform and 
build on subnational experiences of adapting 
DRR strategies and operations to changing 
conflict dynamics, with support (financial and 
technical) from the international community. 
 • For the sustainable pursuit of DRR across 
the country, the government – with support 
from external funders – needs to develop 
strategies to systematically increase budget 
allocations for DRR initiatives. This could 
include building on a narrative of the 
‘resilience dividend’ or harnessing political 
interest in the post-disaster space to drive 
change towards longer-term financing 
mechanisms for risk reduction. In the near 
term, it will be politically strategic for 
champions of DRR to support stronger 
disaster risk governance capacities. 
 • The basic institutional mechanisms required 
for collaboration require strengthening – 
including the promotion of inter-agency 
coordination and learning mechanisms. 
Specifically, the current DRR working groups 
require additional support. Until systematic 
and sustained financing mechanisms are 
in operation through the national budget, 
external donors will need to back-fill the 
funding required to kick-start these initiatives. 
 • Finally, conducting and integrating conflict 
analysis assessments and using them to 
inform the design and delivery of national 
to subnational DRR strategies and plans 
could help ground the ideas currently being 
articulated in DRR policies, test their viability 
and help adapt implementation plans to 
increase the likelihood of tangible and lasting 
results. Success in this area could help make 
the case for more comprehensive multi-risk 
assessments across the country, to inform 
policy and programme design.
Broadly speaking, DRR is rarely anchored in 
existing institutional structures in high-intensity 
conflict contexts. This lack of institutionalisation 
undermines the feasibility, results and 
sustainability of any changes stimulated through 
DRR projects. This in part explains why the 
international community barely finances DRR 
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focused on prevention and/or mitigation in 
high-intensity conflict contexts. But it may be 
feasible to initiate change and accelerate action 
on disaster and conflict risk concurrently.
 • What would it take to initiate operational 
approaches which improve the integration 
of DRR with actions designed to reduce 
the risk of, or avoid exacerbating, conflict? 
An amendment in the law; prominent 
champions? As a starting point, could donors 
commit to enforce do no harm principles 
across their DRR investments? 
 • How can investment in capacity-building 
be sustained? Learning materials can be 
translated into multiple languages to reach 
the local level; is there a role for Kabul 
University or government training institutes 
as partners for capacity-building?  
 • What will it take to move beyond short-term 
financing? Should the Afghan government 
consider establishing multi-donor trust funds 
that would permit this? Other countries 
(such as Bangladesh) have attempted this, to 
varying degrees of success.
 • Are there examples from other high-
intensity conflict countries of increased 
budgetary allocation for DRR by successfully 
mainstreaming DRR across sectoral budgets? 
If so, what messaging was used and how can 
this be adapted to the Afghan context? What 
opportunities exist through new climate 
change funds? Could Afghanistan’s Climate 
Finance Unit provide a precedent?
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Annex 1 Number of 
participants and events
Method Participant/event/documents Code Total 
Semi-structured interviews Government (ANDMA authorities and staff members at national and  
provincial level)
GOV 4 
UN (OCHA at national and provincial level, IOM, UNEP, HABITAT, UNDP) UN 6 
NGOs (COAR, AHRDO, YHDO) NGO 5
INGOs (ARC, Save the Children, Concern, Afghanaid, Aga Khan Habitat) INGO 5
Beneficiaries (group interviews)1* BEN 3
Donors/government entities (SIDA, DFID, World Bank, ECHO, GIZ) DON 5
Private sector and facilitators PRIV 3
Direct observation Multiple stakeholder meetings (e.g. INGO, ANGO, government, UN) OBS-Meetings 4
Ethnographic observations 
of DRR projects
Three mitigation walls, one first aid and earthquake preparedness project,  
one community emergency team project
OBS-Projects 5 
Documents Country policies, strategies, plans and reports on DRR and DRM in Afghanistan DOC 44
* Based on local customs, interviews with one person can bring conflict. All interviews were carried with the group of leaders 
of the community. Mostly, they included an elder, one shura representative (development councils at the village level), and one 
representative of the CDC. In terms of the method for data collection, these group interviews were treated as focus groups. 
One of them was conducted with female representatives and carried out by a female research assistant.
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Annex 2 Documents 
reviewed 
1. Afghanistan Law on Combating Disasters in the Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan, 1991)
2. The Afghanistan National Disaster Plan (Afghanistan, 2003)
3. The Afghanistan Disaster Management Strategy 2014–2017 (MMRD, 2014)
4. Badakhshan Provincial Disaster Management Plan (ANDMA, 2013)
5. Badakhshan Gender Standard for Disaster Risk Management (ANDMA, 2013)
6. The Afghanistan Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) for Disaster Risk Reduction: towards 
peace and stable development (ANDMA, 2011)
7. Support to strategic framework and capacity development design for the Afghanistan National 
Disaster Management Authority (Altai Consulting, 2017)
8. Afghanistan: national progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(2013–2015) (ANDMA, 2015)
9. Sendai Framework data readiness review – report: Afghanistan (ANDMA, 2017)
10.  ‘About ANDMA’ (ANDMA, 2018)
11. Natural Disaster Mitigation Policy in Afghanistan (ANDMA, 2018)
12. Strategic Framework 2018–2028 (ANDMA. 2018)
13. ‘ANDMA Provincial Offices’ (ANDMA, USAID, and IMMAP, 2011)
14. Building Afghanistan’s resilience: natural hazards, climate change, and humanitarian needs 
(ARC, 2016) 
15. Concern’s approach to disaster risk reduction: Afghanistan (Clark-Ginsberg, 2014) 
16. Proposed strategy for institutional strengthening in disaster risk management in Afghanistan 
(DDP, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004)
17. Strategy for Disaster Preparedness (DDP, 2007)
18. Disaster risk reduction: a development concern (DFID, 2004)
19. ECO Regional Framework for disaster risk reduction (ECORFDRR) and regional priorities for 
action (Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 2017)
20. Flash floods damage assessment report and response plan. (FAO, 2014)
21. Afghanistan 2018: humanitarian response plan (FTS, 2018)
22. Law on Combating Disasters in the Republic of Afghanistan (Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan, 1991)
23. ‘Name of ANDMA’ (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2015)
24. National Disaster Management Plan, 2010 Afghanistan (Gupta, Manu and ANDMA, 2010)
25. DREF final report Afghanistan: earthquake (International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRCC), 2016)
26. IOM – Humanitarian Assistance Programme (including DRR components) (IOM and USAID, 
2017)
27. Understanding and preventing social conflict while implementing community-based disaster risk 
reduction in Afghanistan (Rodrigo, 2018)
28. Manual on conflict analysis tools: preventing, mitigating and reducing the risk of social conflict in 
civil DRR projects. (Rodrigo and ARC, 2018) 
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29. Disaster Management Strategy (MMRD, 2014)
30. Climate change and governance in Afghanistan (NEPA and UNEP, 2015)
31. Afghanistan: 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (OCHA, 2016)
32. ‘Afghanistan weekly field report: 3–9 September 2018’ (OCHA, 2018)
33. Humanitarian needs overview 2019: Afghanistan (OCHA, 2018)
34. ‘Afghanistan: overview of natural disasters in 2016’ (OCHA and IOM, 2016)
35. ‘Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR): DRR profile.’ (Prevention Web, 2018) 
36. Afghanistan Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategy (ASDRR) (SMDM and ANDMA, 2018)
37. Disaster risk profile: Afghanistan (World Bank and GFDRR, 2017)
38. Reducing disaster risk: a challenge for development. A global report (UNDP, 2004)
39. Mountain partners: applying Ecosystem-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (Eco-DRR) for sustainable 
and resilient development planning (UNEP, 2016)
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